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the jury at trial of this case.

Such matters are not properly

part of the record on appeal and will not be considered by this
Court when reviewing the merits of the appeal."

A complete copy

of this order is attached for reference as Addendum I.

For what-

ever assistance it might be to the Court, respondent has attached
as Addendum II a copy of Appellant's Brief with the intemperate
statements and references to matters not in the record below deleted by shadowing.

Also, it should be noted that the exhibit

numbers referred to in Appellants Brief are exhibits to his brief
and are not the exhibit numbers of exhibits in this action.

Most

of the brief exhibits are not of record in this action and are
subject to the Court's order of June 11, 1986.
From an examination of Appellant's Brief as modified by the
Court's order of June 11, 1986, respondent perceives the issues
raised by defendant on appeal to be:
1.

Was defendant denied any rights under the Fifth Amendment

to the United States Constitution or Article I, Section 7 of the
Utah Constitution by the trial court's rulings on discovery issues
which prevented defendant from having a fair trial?
2.

Was defendant denied any rights under the First Amendment

to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 15 of
the Utah Constitution in the trial court's ruling that the defamatory statements constituted libel per se if found to be false?
3.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying de-

fendant's motion for a change of venue?
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(Although mentioned in

the brief, defendant did not designate this issue as a point on
appeal).
4.

Did the trial court commit prejudicial error in advising

the jury of the nature of the case it was about to try?
5.

Did the trial court commit prejudicial error in its evi-

dentiary ruling at trial?

(Although mentioned in his brief, de*

fendant did not designate this issue as a point on appeal).
6.

Did the trial court violate defendant's priest-penitent

privilege?
7.

Does the record establish that plaintiff gave perjured

testimony at trial?
These issues will be treated in approximately the same order
as raised in Appellant's Brief.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The purported Statement of Facts in Appellant's Brief fails
to set forth many material facts, and is filled with statements
unsupported by the record in this case, most of which involve
other actions.

Plaintiff, therefore, deems it necessary to re-

state the facts.

The parties are identified as they appeared

below.
A.

Regarding the Book.

Defendant wrote and published a book entitled ONE AGAINST
THE STORM (Ex. 23-P), hereinafter the "Book,11 and a letter to
President Ezra Taft Benson, then an Apostle and now President
of the LDS Church (Ex. 35-P), hereinafter the "Letter," which
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contained untrue, defamatory statements about plaintiff in his
professional capacity as an attorney at law and, therefore, were
libelous per se.

The Book contained eleven statements which plain-

tiff alleged were libelous per se for the reasons set forth in
the Revised Amended Complaint (R.155-168), as noted below:
(a)

On page 12, defendant states that the plaintiff com-

mitted barratry and champerty in the following language:
lf

I fully believed that Mark would let
the matter drop. He would have, too, if only
both of his brothers-in-law, Wayne Wadsworth
and David Young, had not advised him. They
thought there was a good chance that if he
gained custody of the boy, he could still
get control of the trust money." (R.160).
(b)

On page 42, defendant states that the plaintiff bribed

a prospective witness, Dr. Robert H. Marshall, for the apparent
purpose of giving false testimony, at his deposition in the following language:
"The hearing brought out a number of
facts that appalled me. First, it seemed
that Sylvi and Wadsworth (her brother-in-law,
remember), had 'bought' the testimony of an
incompetent doctor whose words simply aped
Sylvi's and Mark's opinions. . . . "
(R.160).
(c)

On page 43, defendant states that the plaintiff mis-

directed the court in the following language:
" . . . But what hurt most was Wheelers
and Wadsworth's attempts to misdirect the
Court. And, unfortunately for David, they
succeeded. . . ." (R.160).
(d)

On page 160, defendant states that the plaintiff em-

ployed improper legal tactics, characterized as "dirty tricks"
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in the following language:
"I was the victim of both lies and innuendos. I shouldn't have been surprised at
Wadsworth1s doing these things. He had good
training; he was a former F.B.I, man, and
I knew from recent disclosures th$t F.B.I.
men were well-trained in dirty tricks." (R.161).
(e)

On page 163, defendant states that plaintiff lied to

the court during the January 1979 hearing, in the following language:
lf

Mr. Wadsworth made patentlyl false and
libelous statements about me personally, unfounded accusations he knew nothing about,
i»

lf

The hearing was held on January 12.
Wadsworth, stood and made blatant statements
- lies - . . ." (R.161).
(f)

On page 178, defendant states thdt the plaintiff com-

mitted perjury and violated his oath as an attorney during the
deposition of Mark Wheeler, in the following language:
"During the day, even while giving his
deposition, he [Mark Wheeler] repeatedly perjured himself. Wadsworth fell into the same
pattern, completely violating the oath which
he took upon becoming an attorney." (R.161).
(g)

On page 179, defendant states that the plaintiff lied,

attempted to mislead the court, and otherwise violated his oath
as an attorney, in the following language:
"Throughout this whole legal mess, Wadsworth repeatedly lied, slandered and attempted
to mislead the judge through tactics which
clearly violated his oath as an attorney."
(R.161-2).
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(h)

On pages 183-4, defendant states that the plaintiff

as an attorney improperly instigated legal proceedings and committed perjury in an attempt to illegally obtain Joan Wheeler's
money for his own personal gain, in the following language:
"After hearing parts of the will, he
[Mark Wheeler] seemed to have all the wind
taken out of his sails. I believe the whole
matter would have been dropped right then
and there, had it not been for Wadsworth and
Dave Young. There is no doubt in my mind
that they incited Mark to action by telling
him that in all probability he could gain
custody of David, and if he did, there might
be some legal technicality they could maneuver
to subvert Joan's last will and testament,
to break the trust and get their hands on
her money.fl
" . . . And Wadsworth - well, I found
Wadsworth to be a classic example of arrogance,
sanctimony, and crudity. He was capable of
anything for personal gain. His lies, perjuries and misrepresentations in this area
clearly characterize his character."
"Despite their obvious record, both of
these men parade around, piously proclaiming
themselves to be practicing Christians. . . .
I sometimes think that it is no accident at least in Utah - the words 'lawyer' and
'liar' sound alike."
ic

-k

ic

". . . Obviously this was
dealery. Wadsworth plotted to
order to defame my character.
this would help them get their
money, . . ." (R.162-3).
(i)

-k

a bit of legal
blame me in
He thought
hands on the

On page 185, defendant states that the plaintiff lied

to opposing counsel and the court during the custody action in
the following language:
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f,

Wadsworth repeatedly lied and contradicted himself in letters and documents to
both Paul Liapis and the Court as well as
at the hearing in front of a judge." (R.163).
(j)

On page 201, defendant accuses the plaintiff of par-

ticipating in an alteration of the transcript of the July 23,
1979 trial in the custody action (although admittedly having been
told by the court reporter that he had not)|, in the following
language:
". . . Aware of other tactics Wadsworth
and Young had used as officers of the law,
I determined to go down to the courthouse
and check the transcript myself . . . .If
". . . The $1,000.00 had been written
on top of correction fluid! At the top of
the 'l1 there was a slight curve resembling
the top of the figure f 3 f - obviously omitted
from the fluid. I was convinced that the
original figure had read 3,000.00 and Mr.
Lewis1 [the court reporter] behavior simply
confirmed my opinion that either Wadsworth
or Young had taken it upon themselves to have
the figure changed.11
". . . When I observed the actions of
these two attorneys, I find it impossible
to believe that all these things happened
merely by chance. . . . " (R.163-4).
(k)

On pages 205-6, defendants infer that the plaintiff

lied to the court during a hearing in the tort action when he
represented to the court that Mark Wheeler was employed by Touche
Ross, in the following language:
"Wadsworth had everything planned. He
presented Judge Winder with a letter from
Mark with the instructions that ,the letter
was for the judge's eyes only. . . . "
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"After reading the letter, Judge Winder
asked, fis this Mr. Wheeler an accountant
for Touche Ross?1 Wadsworth, after a hesitation and a bit of stammering said, 'well,
no, Your Honor. He is sort of . . . a . . .
ah ah . . . i n business . . . ah . . . management.1 He was visibly shaken. He hadn't
expected the judge to mention Touche Ross.
Wadsworth1s stammering made me doubt the authenticity of that letter. . . .,f
"Back at my office, I called my attorney
in California and asked him to check with
Touche Ross. In less than one hour he called
back to report that Touche Ross said Mark's
employment with them ended in 1976 and he
had not worked for them since.ff (R.164).
The Letter contained the following language accusing the
plaintiff of perjury:
"In a deposition, Wayne Wadsworth, attorney for the Wheeler's (and also their Brother-in-law) stated it was He and David Young
who went to see Elder Hanks on May 22nd and
the subject of attempted murder was never
discussed. . . .
I called Bishop Heinz out
of the meeting to tell him of the obvious
perjury on the part of Wayne Wadsworth."
(R.165, Ex.35-P).
At the commencement of trial, defendant moved the court to
strike certain allegations of libel regarding the Book on the
ground that they were mere opinions, or subject to more than one
interpretation (R.500-512).

The court struck plaintiff's allega-

tion regarding statement (a) holding that it was not libelous
(R.517), but held in effect that statements (b) regarding bribing
a witness, (c) regarding misleading the court, (d) regarding dirt
tricks, (e) regarding perjury, (f) regarding perjury, (g) regardi
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lying and misleading the Court, (h) regarding perjury and misrepresentation, (i) regarding lying to a judge, and (k) regarding

I

altering an official court record were libelous per se as to an
attorney and would remain in the action (R.518-20).
In addition to the specific defamatoryistatements made regarding plaintiff, the Book contains many general accusations
against the legal profession.

The Book on its back cover states:

M

The facade of respectibility of professional
people - legal, judicial, political and religious - BARED."
"Her death brought such bizarre a^id incredible
circumstances as to bogle [sic] the human
mind. This could happen to anyone."
"They were victims of legal brutality and
chauvinistic judges."
The Author's Note contains the following statements:
"ONE AGAINST THE STORM is true. The people
are real, their names unchanged. The documented incidents are examples of love, hate,
greed, betrayal, discrimination, revenge that
extends beyond the grave, legal chicanery,
brutality, and perjury, judicial incompetence
and dishonesty."
*

*

*

"The professional people involved in this
story are recognized in legal, judicial, political and religious circles; nonetheless,
they have lied, perjured, and subverted justice for personal gain. . . . "
*

*

*

"While many have realized that the account
must be told, I am totally and exclusively
responsible for the telling. No one, except
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me, is responsible for deciding to publish
the volumes, and to reveal the astonishing
and squalid details of a system of fjustice!
that makes a mockery of our present society.
Stanley C. Mann"
At pages 181-2 it states:
"Other states are moving to correct the
injustices which have been forced upon citizens by the legal profession in ever-increasing
numbers. Utah is lagging far behind. Why
are reputable members of the profession protecting the likes of a conspiring Wadsworth
and Young? . . . Whatever the reason, because
of their greed in achieving the accoutrements
of success (money, prestige, e t c ) , most of
them seem to lack the backbone and character
to take a stand in correcting obvious injustices perpetrated upon people.
And at page 184, referring to Mormon attorneys, states:
"Does their conscience allow them to openly
lie, or do they hide behind the rhetorical
answer: 'Yes, I am honest within the context
of my profession.' (I have been advised by
several of these spiritual leaders that more
and more lawyers are responding in just this
manner. But even this can in no way justify
their unethical or immoral behavior. I sometimes think it is no accident that - at least
in Utah - the words 'lawyer' and 'liar1 sound
alike.)"
Further, at page 190-91 the defendant states:
"During the hearing the judge (Judge
Baldwin) acted completely without dignity.
He was uninformed about the statutes he himself referred to. He cited examples and then
when it came down to it, he changed the subject abruptly because it was obvious he couldn't
follow through on the cases. Judge Baldwin
ran true to form.
It isn't necessary to look at daily conflicts in national publications. The open
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misuse of judicial power, right here in Utah,
is apparent every day" Thira District Judge
James Sawaya gave as a lame excuse for the
sentencing of a recent rate case: fI am given
no choice in this matter by the statutes.'
The excuse fI am given no choice in this
matter,' used by weak judges is so familiar
that the public gets billious every time they
hear it.'1
Further down on page 191, the defendant states:
f,

Judge Baldwin implies that you can be a good
family man even if you lie and perjure and
abandon and commit adultry."
(All emphasis added).
B.

Regarding the court's statements about the Book.

In view of the specific and general attacks the defendant
makes upon the legal and judicial system in Utah in the Book,
the trial court at the commencement of trial advised the jury
of the general nature of the case and inquired whether any had
opinions either for or against lawyers generally.

The portion

of which defendant saw fit to have transcribed reads:
"The Court: Ladies and gentlemen, the
book One Against the Storm which I'm holding
up again, in part deals with the legal profession, and it's not the legal profession
as a whole. I think it deals wijth the legal
profession in Utah. Is there anyone here
who has any opinion either for or against
the lawyers who practice law in the state
of Utah? In other words, do you feel they're
either more truthful than the populous as
a whole? If you feel that way, raise your
hand.
The Court: Let the record show no hands
are raised." (R.499).
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The record does not show any objection or expection to this statement by the court.
C.

Regarding discovery.

Concerning defendant's claims of denial of discovery rights,
the following appears of record:
(a)

Defendants' motion to compel discovery which was argued

to Judge Dee on the law and motion bench on February 9, 1982 regarding Defendants' First Set of Interrogatories to Plaintiff
referred to on page 13 of Appellant's Brief could not be ruled
upon because said interrogatories were not before the court when
defendant's motion to compel was heard (R.263), they not being
filed until February 25, 1982 (R.68).
(b)

On September 7, 1982, Judge Fishier, who was now the

law and motion judge, continued defendant's motion to compel discovery for a special setting when the court and counsel could
make a detailed review of the interrogatories and requests for
production to which objections had been filed (R.191,195-7) .
Defendant contends on page 14 of his brief that no such review
ever took place, but then states that Judge Fishier informed Robert
Sherlock, his attorney, that the discovery requests would not
be allowed.
ment.

There is nothing in the record to support this state-

The record is devoid of any evidence that defendant or

his attorney ever brought the motion to compel before Judge Fishier
on a special setting.
(c)

On February 8, 1984, defendant filed a motion to compel
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discovery (R.285) which was heard by Judge Dee, to whom the case
had now been assigned, who took the matter under advisement (R.287).
(d)

On March 16, 1984, before Judge Dee had ruled on defen-

dant's motion, defendant filed a motion to recuse Judge Dee (R.31516).

As a result of defendant's motion, thp case was assigned

to Judge Fishier.
(e)

Defendant never renewed his motion to compel before

Judge Fishier, and on May 8, 1984 defendant filed a notice requesting a scheduling conference and trial setting (R.332).

The

scheduling conference was held on May 14, 1984 with no reference
to defendant's renewing his motion to compel (R.334).

At the

hearing, trial was set for July 25, 1984 and no further discovery
matters were raised prior to the trial.
(f)

During the pendency of this matter, plaintiff volun-

tarily answered a considerable number of discovery requests which
he deemed relevant (R.56-59, 240-47, 297-303).
Most of the discovery defendant requested to which plaintiff objected was irrelevant to the issues of this case.

As an

example, defendant's First Set of Interrogatories to Plaintiff
(R.68-85) referred to at page 13 of Appellant's Brief requests
information regarding:
(a)

Whether or not plaintiff's client Mark Wheeler requested

an award of attorney's fees in the custody case (No. 10);
(b)

Identification of insurance policies on the life of

Mark Wheeler (No. 17);
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(c)

Whether or not Mark Wheeler owned a .22 cal. weapon

(No. 21);
(d)

Whether or not Mark Wheeler and his wife have had extra-

marital relations (No. 25);
(e)

Whether or not Mark Wheeler was ever employed to tran-

sport motion pictures, films or video cassettes from one location
to another (No. 27);
(f)

Identification of plaintiff's appointments, travels

and meetings from December 29, 1978 through December 15, 1981
(No. 34);
(g)

Whether or not Mark Wheeler had ever had any arguments

or disputes with anyone for a period of years (No. 46).
With respect to Defendant's Request for Admissions (R.220229), containing 103 requests, referred to at page 15 of defendant's brief, defendant requests admissions:
(a)

That plaintiff knew that Judge Croft had ruled on the

Manns' grounds of abandonment was a claim with merit enough to
order a trial and order Wheelers to post the bond to bring David
Wheeler back to trial (No. 4 ) ;
(b)

That Mark and Sylvi Wheeler traveled from California

to Utah to attend a Christmas party at plaintiff's residence before they were married (No. 9 ) ;
(c)

That plaintiff's answer to a question posed by Scott

E. Savage regarding motive is contrary to the ruling of Judge
Croft and that plaintiff knew of no incident when Manns were told
they had no legal right to pursue custody on the grounds of abandonment (No. 16);
-14-

(d)

That plaintiff has no alibi as to his whereabouts at

the time Mark Wheeler was shot (No. 40);
(e)

That plaintiff acknowledged in a letter to Paul Liapis

that Wheelers had had telephone calls from the Manns (No. 43);
(f)

That plaintiff was aware of Article VIII of the Utah

Constitution at the time Judge Baldwin was assigned to hear the
custody case (No. 53);
(g)

That plaintiff had far greater knowledge of Mark Wheeler's

comings and goings than the defendant (No. 66);
(h)

That plaintiff's testimony of driving by defendant's

residence tends to give plaintiff an alibi (No. 73);
(i)

That Mark Wheeler lied to plaintiff about any other

difficulties with people other than the defendant (No. 83);
(j)

That plaintiff was requested to provide sizes for David

so that the Manns could exchange clothes for correct sizes but
plaintiff never did so (No. 88);
(k)

That Sylvi Wheeler's account of third persons watching

the shooting and other circumstances surrounding the shooting
differs in her first and second depositions and from her husband's
depositions and from what she told the police and that which appears in the police report (No. 97);
(1)

That Paul Liapis filed an affidavit with the Colorado

court swearing that plaintiff had made a false statement in sworn
testimony filed with the Colorado court (No. 101); and
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(m)

That on one or more occasions plaintiff has called some-

one and arranged to have charges on traffic citations altered
and/or dropped (No. 103).
D.

Regarding the court's evidentiary rulings at trial.

At page 24 of his brief, defendant complains that the court
refused to admit in evidence the Revised Rules of Professional
Conduct of the Utah State Bar.

However, the record shows that

said rules were marked as Exhibit 1-D, and was not offered (R.355).
At page 26 of his brief, defendant likewise complains that the
court refused to admit a letter to the Utah State Bar.

This letter

was marked as Exhibit 14-D, but was withdrawn (R.355).

Further,

on page 27 of his brief, defendant complains that M[o]ne of the
more blatant denials of due process" was the court refusal to
admit, after both parties had rested (R.939), a letter which his
counsel had never offered, and which his counsel agreed need not
be admitted so long as the jury was advised that defendant's counsel had produced the letter for inspection by plaintiff's counsel
as requested (R.940).
E.

Regarding defendant's proposed trial evidence.

With respect to defendant's burden to prove the truthfulness
of the defamatory statements made regarding plaintiff, defendant
indicated in answer to plaintiff's interrogatories that said statements could be proved by the testimony of Mark Wheeler, Byron
Fisher, Dr. Marshall, Paul Liapis, Los Angeles police officers,
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priesthood class sources and Los Angeles attorney Morton Gramas
(R.210-15).

None of these individuals were ever deposed or called

as witnesses at trial.

Likewise, in the pretrial order defendant

indicated that he may call five witnesses (R.340-41) who were
not called.

In fact, defendant's counsel called only the defen-

dant and the plaintiff as witnesses at trial (R.494), and read
from one deposition.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court correctly held that the statements contained
on pages 42, 43, 160, 163, 178, 179, 183-4, 185, 201 and 205-6
of the Book (Ex. 23-P) and in the Letter (Ex. 35-P) were libelous
per se.

The truthfulness of said statements were put in issue

by plaintiff's denial of them at 112 of the Revised Amended Complaint (R.165).

As acknowledged by defendant's counsel at the

beginning of trial, defendant then had the burden of proving their
truthfulness (R.505).

Defendant did not meet that burden as evi-

denced by the jury's verdict in favor of the plaintiff with respect to the statements in Book (R.353) and the statement in the
Letter (R.354).
The discovery requests to which plaintiff objected and which
defendant did not notice for a special hearing, for the most part,
did not relate to the relevant issues of this lawsuit.
The conduct and rulings of the trial court in no way impaired
defendant's right to a fair trial and, therefore, the trial court's
judgments entered on the jury verdicts should be affirmed.
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POINT I.
DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS UNDER THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE
I, SECTION 7 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION WERE
NOT VIOLATED BY THE TRIAL COURT'S RULINGS
ON DISCOVERY ISSUES.
Although defendant's Point I is couched in terms of denial
of constitutional rights of due process, the gravamen of his argument appears to be that he was denied certain discovery.
Beginning at page 12 of his brief, defendant contends that
he was denied pre-trial discovery by the plaintiff, plaintiff's
counsel and the court.

However, defendant's first motion to com-

pel discovery before Judge Dee was frustrated because of his own
failure to have the interrogatories in question in the court's
file (R.263), a circumstance not the fault of the plaintiff, plaintiff's counsel or the court.

As previously noted, so far as the

record indicates, defendant did not notice up a special hearing
before Judge Fishier to consider defendant's second motion to
compel, after Judge Fishier continued the motion for a special
setting.

Later, on February 8, 1984, after Judge Dee was assigned

the case, defendant filed a third motion to compel which Judge
Dee took under advisement, but before Judge Dee had ruled on the
motion, defendant on March 14, 1984 filed a motion to recuse Judge
Dee (R.315-16), which was granted.

The case was then assigned

to Judge Fishier and on May 8, 1984 defendant filed a notice requesting a scheduling conference and trial date.
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Defendant never

renewed his motion to compel before Judge Fishier.
The pretrial order prepared by defendant's counsel (R.336-42)
makes no reference to outstanding discovery or any pending motions
to compel.

The trial date is set for July 25, 1984, with discovery

to be completed by June 15, 1984.

The record is devoid of any

discovery matters being presented to Judge Fishier after he is
assigned the case following defendant's motion to recuse Judge
Dee.
If defendant felt that the resolution bf any unresolved discovery matters were necessary to his case, he had a responsibility
to bring them to Judge Fishler's attention before trial, not to
this Court's attention after trial.
Nevertheless, when considering the substance of defendant's
complaints, it is apparent that he suffered no prejudicial error.
In defendant's answer to plaintiff's Interrogatory No. 16, defendant set forth the alleged facts upon which he would rely to prove
his defamatory statements (R.210-15).

The interrogatories in

question show little relationship to these alleged facts, as noted
at pp. 13-14, supra.

Similarly, defendant's requests for admis-

sions run far afield of the facts alleged }n answer to Interrogatory No. 16.

See pp. 14-16, supra.

Farther, the requests

for admissions generally relate to documents and transcripts which
speak for themselves and, if relevant, easily could have been
introduced at trial.

For example:
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"You knew Judge Croft had ruled that the Manns'
grounds of abandonment was a claim with merit
enough to order a trial and order the Wheelers
to post a bond to bring David Wheeler back
to Utah.1' (No. 4 ) .
"That Elder Marion D. Hanks in both his depositions has denied that the subject you stated
as the reason for Dave Young's and your visit
to him was never discussed." (No. 10).
"You answered to a question posted by Scott
E. Savage regarding motive, is contrary to
the ruling of Judge Croft and that you know
of no incident when the Manns were told they
had no legal right to pursue custody on the
grounds of abandonment." (No. 16).
"You heard Mark Wheeler testify to having
disputes with other people in the Navy and
at Sun Classics before you denied the existence of such incidences on May 21, 1980 in
Judge Winder's court." (No. 21).
"You made the statement in writing 'since
that is the course of action that a normal
innocent person would take, Mr. Mann's refusal
to take the examination can lead to only one
conclusion.'" (No. 35).
"Admit that you acknowledged in a letter to
Paul Liapis that the Wheelers had had telephone calls from the Manns." (No. 43).
"Your answer to the question posed to you
on page 181, lines 12-15, of your deposition,
is not accurate." (No. 45).
"On page 196 and 197, of your deposition,
you state that on the tape of the interview
between the Los Angeles Detectives and Stanley
C. Mann, he had trouble understanding whose
money the trust was. Admit that no such statement or likeness of such statement is on the
tape." (No. 47).
"Your statement on Page 158, Lines 16 thru
24 of your deposition is not true." (No.
70).
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lf

Your statement made at the custody hearing
on January 11, 1979 (found on Page 14, Line
11 thru 14 of the transcript was not true."
(No. 80).
|
The plain fact of the matter was that defendant was wholly
unable to show the truthfulness of any of his defamatory statements.

He, therefore, sought to besmirch the reputation of plain-

tiff by getting into other litigation wholly unrelated to the
Wheelers or the Manns.

The simple issue before the jury was whether

the defamatory statements of plaintiff published by defendant
were true.

None of the interrogatories or requests for admissions

to which plaintiff objected were calculated to shed light on that
issue.
POINT II.
DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT
TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION OR ARTICLE
I, SECTION 15 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION WERE
NOT VIOLATED BY THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT
THE DEFAMATORY STATEMENTS CONSTITUTED LIBEL
PER SE.
Although defendant's Point II is couched in terms of denial
of constitutional free speech rights, what defendant is really
arguing is that the defamatory statements of which plaintiff complains were not libelous per se because th^y were expressions
of personal opinion rather than statements of fact.
In Allred v. Cook, 590 P.2d 318 (Utah 1979) this Court held
that
"In order to constitute slander per se, without a showing of special harm, it is necessary
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that the defamatory words fall into one of
four categories: (1) charge of criminal conduct, . . . (3) charge of conduct that is
incompatible with the exercise of a lawful
business, trade, profession, or office; . . . .
The defamatory words are actionable if they
impute a want of capacity or fitness for engaging in the plaintiff's profession or if
-,,
they render him unfit to fulfill his duties."—
There can be no doubt that defendant's statements in the
Book (Ex. 23-P) charging the plaintiff attorney with buying the
testimony of a witness (p. 42), misdirecting the court (p. 43,
179), dirty tricks (p. 160), lying to the court (p. 163, 185,
205-6), violating his oath as an attorney (p. 178, 179), perjuries
(p. 178, 183-4) and altering a court transcript (p. 201) are incompatible with the practice of law and would in fact render an
attorney unfit to fulfill his duties in the practice of law.
In addition, the charges in the Book of perjuries (p. 178, 183-4)
and in the Letter (Ex. 35-P) are charges of criminal conduct ranging
from a class B misdemeanor to a second degree felony.

5576-8-502,

503 and 504, U.C.A., 1953, as amended.
Defendant attempts to avoid the liability that attaches to
such libelous per se statements by contending on page 29, et seq.,
of his brief that such statements were statements of belief and
opinion and, therefore, are not actionable and cites Ogden Bus
Lines v. KSL, Inc., 551 P.2d 222 (Utah 1976) as authority for

1. Elements of Libel per se reiterated in Baum v. Gillman, 667
P.2d 41 (Utah 1983).
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such position.

The facts of that case are substantially different

from those in the present action.

First, KSL is a public media

and enjoys a qualified privilege of "fair comment'1 in the innocent
publication of false statements.

Cianci v. New Times Publishing

Co., 639 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1980).

Second, the statement in ques-

tion, Mthat the driver of the school bus involved in a collision
with a dump truck a few days ago has been charged with driving
on a revoked license11 was in fact a true statement as noted by
the court at 224:
"There is no evidence in the record showing
or tending to show that any statements of
fact made by defendant in the editorial concerning any plaintiff were false. On the
contrary, the facts therein stated are shown
by the evidence to be true, and therefore
are not actionable.11
Third, the strongest part of the opinion portion of KSL's editorial stated:
"This fact must not lead us to make any judgments as to the responsibility for this accident. However, KSL believes the conclusion
is warranted that the operator of the vehicle,
Ogden City Bus Lines was lax. . . . KSL
believes it would be well for all school districts in the state to review their policy
for the employment of school bus drivers.
Obviously, the lives of children must be placed
in the care only of those who have demonstrated
that they are competent to hold that trust."
(Emphasis added).

As can be seen, the opinion statements of KSL
i

were quite different than the vitriolic statements which defendant
contends are his opinions.

Defendant did not state, as KSL did,
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that his statements were mere opinions or beliefs.

For the most

part, they were couched in terms of actual fact.
Further, if purported facts and implied opinions are interwoven in an article so that the reader is presented with an opinion conveyed as part and parcel of the factual disclosure, the
"fair comment" defense available to the news media does not apply.
Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., supra.

A fortiori, a private

party must be held liable where his opinions are part and parcel
of the factual statement.
Defendant cites no authority for the proposition that libelous per se statements of a private person regarding another private person are privileged if they are also the beliefs and opinions of the declarant, and plaintifffs research has discovered
no such authority.
Since in this case there is ample evidence of libelous per
se statements made by the defendant, the rule of Akins v. Altus
Newspapers, Inc., 609 P.2d 1263 (Okl. 1980), should be followed
regarding libelous per se statements made of a police officer
wherein the court stated at 1276:
"Where there is any competent evidence reasonably tending to support the verdict, this
court does not disturb it." (Sic).
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A CHANGE OF VENUE.
Although defendant did not make a special point of it in
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his brief, on page 18 thereof, defendant complains of the court's
denial of his motion for a change of venue.

Based upon defen-

dant's attack upon some judges of the Third District Court in
his Book and the fact that some judges had heard other matters
involving him, defendant could have legitimately challenged those
particular judges if one of them had been assigned the trial of
this case, but Judge Fishier was not one of those judges and was
not mentioned in the Book.

Judge Fishier notes in his minute

entry (R.192) denying defendant's motion for a change of venue
that:
"The motion in effect seeks to disqualify
every judge in this district en mass. The
defendants may wish to challenge certain judges
in the district but this should be done on
an individual basis." (Sic.)
Copies of this minute entry were maile|d to counsel on September 16, 1982.

Defendant's counsel never challenged Judge Fishier's

assignment to this case pursuant to Rule 63(b), U.R.C.P.

Since

that issue was not raised in the trial court, even if it had merit,
it could not be raised at this stage of the proceedings.

Utah

County v. Brown, 672 P.2d 82, 85 (Utah 1983); Franklin Financial
v. New Empire Development Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah 1983).
Moreover, plaintiff had a legal right to have the case tried
before a Salt Lake County jury in view of the fact that both plaintiff and defendant were residents of Salt Lake County, that plaintiff practices law in Salt Lake County and that the cause of action
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arose in Salt Lake County.
as amended.

See, Section 78-13-7, U.C.A., 1953,

There is no suggestion in defendant's brief that

he could not have a fair trial before a Salt Lake County jury,
or that the jurors impaneled to try this case were not unbiased
or fair-minded.

Neither is there any evidence that Judge Fishier

was not fair-minded or could not, would not, or did not give defendant a fair trial.
POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY
AS TO THE NATURE OF THE CASE IT WAS ABOUT
TO TRY.
Defendant at Point III of his brief challenges the trial
court's language in advising the jury as to the nature of the
case it was about to try.

Defendant seems to claim that the state-

ment was not a balanced one since it

ff

is an affront to the attor-

neys and judges which are spoken well of in the book."

If attor-

neys and judges are spoken well of in the Book, it is somewhere
plaintiff has been unable to find, and certainly is not on the
back cover, in the Authors Note, in the Foreword, or in the chapters entitled Legal Chicanery, More Chicanery and Birds of a Feather,
the first paragraph of which states:
"Probably the main thing wrong with judges
is that they were previously lawyers. The
practice of law distorts a man's common sense
more than any other experience in the world.
Enough exposure to the lack of ethics and
morality common to such a large majority of
those practicing law today would pervert the
purposes of many a man. Some of these men
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become judges. In many cases they not only
hand out fallicious decisions, they also usurp,
legally, the prerogatives and responsibilities
of our legislatures. They hand out rulings
not voted on by duly elected legislators such
as school busing, secret trials, plea bargaining, etc."
The inquiry made of the jury by the court of :
n

[i]s there anyone here who has any opinion
either for or against the lawyers who practice
law in the state of Utah? In other words,
do you feel theyfre either more truthful than
the populous as a whole? If you feel that
way, raise your hand11
was as much in the interest of the defendant as the plaintiff.
Considering the rather scurrilous attacks defendant had made upon
the legal profession, it would be important for him and his counsel
to know if there were any members of the jury which had any particular affinities for, or close relationships with, members of
the legal profession.
question is not biased.

The statement of the court preceding the
The court does not quote from the Book,

but merely states:
"The Book One Against the Storm which I'm
holding up again, in part deals with the legal
profession, and it's not the legal profession
as a whole. I think it deals with the legal
profession in Utah."
Plaintiff submits that there is nothing biased or prejudicial
about the statement or the question posed to the jury.

It was

a proper introduction of a case the jury was about to try in order
to determine if there were any prospective jurors who may have
had personal feelings either for or against members of the legal
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profession, or of those who may criticize the profession.

It

is the kind of question that almost certainly would be asked of
any prospective jurors in any case involving a practicing attorney, either as a party plaintiff or defendant.
Further, defendant made no objection to the court's statement
and question to the prospective jurors.

Even if the comments

of the court were objectionable, such objection cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal.

Meier v. Christensen, 15 Utah 2d

182, 389 P.2d 734 (1964).
POINT V.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS EVIDENTIARY
RULINGS.
Although defendant has not raised the trial court's evidentiary rulings as a point on appeal, he complained of them in his
brief.

At page 24 defendant complains that the Revised Rules

of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar was not received
in evidence.

However, the record shows that it was marked as

Exhibit 1-D, but was not offered (R.355).

At page 26 he complains

that a letter to the Utah State Bar was refused, but, again, the
record shows that it was marked as Exhibit 14-D and that it was
withdrawn (R.355).
Defendant states that "[o]ne of the more blatant denials
of [his] due process" was the court's refusal of a letter offered
by his counsel after both sides had rested and which his counsel
agreed need not be entered if the jury was advised that it had
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been produced for inspection by plaintiff's counsel as requested
(R.940) and of which the jury was so advised as agreed (R.950).
If such circumstance represents one of the more blatant denials of defendant's rights of due process, the Court can rest
assured that defendant received a fair triajL.
POINT VI.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT VIOLATE DEFENDANT'S
PRIEST/PENITENT PRIVILEGE.
Defendant does not challenge the fact that a copy of the
libelous Letter (Ex. 35-P) sent to President Ezra Taft Benson,
which he contends was privileged, was also sent to his brother
Charles C. Mann.

Defendant makes no claim that Charles C. Mann

held any ecclesiastical position regarding him.

It is elementary

that if a communication which otherwise would be privileged is
communicated to a person not involved in the privilege, the privilege is lost.

In Naum v. State, 630 P.2d 785 (Okl. 1981), cert,

denied, 102 S.Ct. 609, 454 U.S. 1058, 78 L.Ed. 597 (1981), where
a defendant's confession to a clergyman was intended to be relayed
to defendant's attorney, it was held that testimony of the clergyman at trial violated neither the priest-penitent nor the attorney-client privilege.
In Utah, the priest-penitent privilege is codified as follows:
"A clergyman or priest cannot, without the
consent of the person making the confession,
be examined as to any confession made to him
in his professional character in the course
of discipline enjoyed by the church to which
he belongs."
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§78-24-8(3), U.C.A., 1953, as amended.

Thus, the Utah statute

cloaks only a person's "confessions'1 to a clergyman.

It does

not protect allegations made against third parties as in the instant case.

Privileges are to be strictly construed since they

"close another window to the light of truth."

State v. Gotfrey,

598 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1979).
The trial court did not err in admitting the letter in question since (1) the substance thereof was not a confession and
(2) it was intentionally sent to a non-privileged third-party.
POINT VII.
PLAINTIFF DID NOT GIVE PERJURED TESTIMONY
AT TRIAL.
Defendant's last point is that plaintiff gave perjured testimony at trial.

This claim is based principally upon the fact

that plaintiff's testimony differs from that of Paul Liapis regarding whether or not certain settlement negotiations took place
in other litigation, and differences in testimony between plaintiff and other individuals which are not of record in this action.
Suffice it to say that the testimony of plaintiff which defendant
contends is perjured in this action is

substantially the same

testimony defendant claimed in his Book was perjured, and the
jury in this case found that the Book was libelous, which would
seem to indicate that it did not believe plaintiff had committed
perjury.

Further, and more pertinent, is the fact that the jury

found that defendant's Letter to President Ezra Taft Benson was
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libelous (R.354) and the only claim of libel made with respect
to the Letter was that defendant had charged plaintiff with "obvious perjury11 (Ex. 35-P) .

It should be noted that in order for

a person to be guilty of perjury, not only must the statement
be false, but the declarant must have believed it to have been
false when made, §76-8-502(1), U.C.A., 1953, as amended; or in
the case of inconsistent statements, that one or the other was
believed to be false when made, 76-8-502(2), U.C.A., 1953, as
amended.

Perjury does not arise from frailities of memory, inad-

vertent misstatements or differences of opipion, impression or
emphasis.
CONCLUSION
The defamatory statements contained in the Book ONE AGAINST
THE STORM and the Letter to President Ezra Taft Benson were correctly held by the trial court to be libelous per se since they
attacked the plaintiff in his professional capacity as an attorney.

The jury found the defamatory statements to be false and,

therefore, the trial court's judgments entered thereon should
be affirmed.
Defendant has complained that he was denied certain discovery,
but the record shows that he failed to diligently bring such matters to the trial court's attention, particularly after the case
was reassigned to Judge Fishier following defendant's motion to
recuse Judge Dee.

From that date to date of trial, no discovery

was requested or unresolved discovery matters brought to Judge
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Fishier1s attention.

Therefore, defendant cannot now complain

of the lack of such discovery.
The trial court committed no prejudicial error, either during
trial or in its pretrial rulings.

Finally, there is no evidence

that plaintiff committed perjury during the course of the trial.
The same testimony of which defendant complains in his brief was
presented to the jury by the defendant in this case in an attempt
to defend against plaintiff's charge that the Book and Letter
were libelous.

The jury found that the Book and Letter were,

in fact, libelous, thus of necessity finding that plaintiff had
not committed perjury.
Both parties received a fair trial of the issues raised in
this action and, therefore, the trial court's judgments upon the
jury verdicts should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of August, 1986.

RAY R. CHRISTENSEN

GAINER M. WALDBILLIG
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL
900 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent
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PER CURIAM;
This matter is before us en plaintiff's motion to
dismiss defendant's appeal for failure to designate a final
..appealable order in his notice of appeal
Plaintiff also
moves to strike defendant's entire brief because it does not
comply with Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
and contains false and abusive references to'plaintiff's
• attorney. We deny plaintiff's motion, but strike all
references to plaintiff's attorney that are contained in
defendant's brief on appeal,
Plaintiff's motion to dismiss is premised merely upon
defendant's defective notice of appeal, which does not
properly designate the final judgment from which the appeal is
taken. Utah R. App. P. 3(d). Following entry of the judgment
on the jury's verdict, both parties timely filed post-judgment
motions in the trial court, thereby suspending the running of
time in which to file an appeal. Utah R. App. P« 4(b).
Defendant's motion for new trial was later withdrawn. On
September 23, 1985, the trial court orally granted plaintiff's
' motion to amend the judgment. The written order granting the
motion to amend was entered on October 8, 19 85. Thereafter,
defendant timely filed his appeal under Rule 4, but mistakenly
designated in his notice that the order appealed from was the
oral rul ing of September 23, 1985.
Although defendant improperly designated the
September 23 oral ruling as the judgment from which his appeal
was taken, it is clear in this case that he intended to appeal
the entire judgment entered in August 1984 and made final by
the court's written order of October 8, 1985. Fairly
construed in the context of this case, defendant's notice
informs plaintiff that defendant's appeal is not from an oral
ruling, but is an appeal from the entire judgment. Plaintiff
has not been misled or confused in any way as to the matters
being appealed or the extent of defendant's claims on appeal.
The purpose of the notice of appeal is to place the opposing
party on notice that an appeal is being taken and to fairly

identify the court's action being appealed. Wood v. Turner, 18
Utah 2d 229, 419 P.2d 634 (1966); Schroeder v. Meier-Templeton
Associates, Inc.,
130 111. App. 3d 554, 474 N.E.2d 744, 748
(1984).x When a notice of appeal from a final order is timely
filed and the plaintiff is not misled thereby, a technical
defect in the notice does not destroy the jurisdiction of this
Court. Utah R. App. P. 3(a); cases cited supra note 1.
Plaintiff does not claim or show any prejudice
resulting from the obvious mistake in the notice. He knew that
defendant intended to appeal from the entire judgment,
particularly since defendant had previously filed a premature
notice of appeal before the judgment had become final. Both
parties had agreed to dismissal of that appeal in order for the
post-judgment motions to be resolved and the judgment made
final. While we expect all parties before us to comply with
this Court's rules, it is contrary to the spirit and intent of
our rules that decisions on the merits be avoided by mere
technicalities when neither side is prejudiced thereby.2 We
consider the mistaken designation in the notice to be harmless
in this case.
Defendant's brief already filed with this Court
contains several accusations against plaintiff's attorney that
are entirely unrelated to any proper resolution of the issues
defendant presents for our review. As we stated in State v.
Cook, 714 P.2d 296, 297 (Utah 1986), derogatory references to
others and inappropriate language have no place in an appellate
brief and are of no assistance in a proper resolution of those
matters legitimately prosecuted on appeal. The highest
standards of conduct and deportment are required of those who
appear before this Court and other courts of our state.
We have examined those portions of defendant's brief
containing the calumnious and impertinent language accusing
plaintiff's attorney of impropriety. None of defendant's
statements are supported by the record. His accusations are
entirely groundless and unnecessarily reflect adversely upon
the integrity and high standards of this Court and of counsel.
After careful consideration of the record below, we find no
basis or justification whatever for the accusatory and
intemperate language used in referring to counsel. We
1. Accord Widener v. District Court of Jefferson County, 200
Colo. 398, 615 P.2d 33 (1980); Spurlin v. Paul Brown Agency,
Inc., 80 N.M. 306, 454 P.2d 963 (1969); Beltram v. Appellate
Dep't of Superior Court for Los Angeles County, 66 Cal. App- 3d
711, 136 Cal- Rptr. 211 (1977); 9 J. Moore, W. Taggert & J.
Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice § 203.18 (2d ed. 1985).
2. Cf^ Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962); Vigil v. United
States, 430. F.2d 1357 (10th Cir. 1970).
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therefore order "-hat all references t
stricken from t
bri*afO

pla* *"i£f's attorney be

U Ltli respect to plaintiff's remaining claim, that
defendant's entire brief should be stricken because the facts
alleged therein are not supported by the record, we have
examined the current appeal record in this case, Including the
exhibits introduced at trial. Defendant's designation of the
record also attempts to include material not presented to the
court or to the jury at the trial of this case. Such matters
are not properly part of the record on appeal and will not be
considered by this Court when reviewing the merits of the
appeal. Matter of Cluff's Estate, 587 P.2d 128 (Utah 1978) ;
Campos v. Campos, 523 P.2d 1235 (Utah 1974). We note that,
although designated, the trial transcript has not yet been
made part of the record. Consequently, we are unable to fully
ascertain In every instance what matters_jnay or may not be
fully supportable by the record below.
Wood v. Myrup, 681 P»2a 1255 (Utah 1984).
^t this stage of the appeal, however, it will impose
delay and will further burden this Court and the parties to
strike defendant's brief. Consideration of defendant's
contentions on appeal will be unnecessarily delayed b\
requiring him to file a new brief. Alternatively, a greater
inconvenience and burden would be imposed upon this Court if
it were required to resolve defendant's contentions without
the benefit of his arguments. Therefore, appellant's brief
will not be stricken entirely. To the extent that the
arguments and allegations therein are extraneous or are net
supported by the record, they will be disregarded in reviewing
the legitimate issues raised.
In accordance with the principles stated herein,
plaintiff's motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, to
strike defendant's brief is denied. Those portions of
defendant's brief which refer to plaintiff's counsel pre
herebv stricken from the brief.

Zimmerman, Justice, having disqualified himself, dees
not participate herein.
This opinion is not regarded as adding anything
significant to existing law and hence is not to be published
In the Utah Reporter cr the Pacxfic Reporter.
~. cf"! Gregoir¥^T7""National Bank of Alaska^ 413 P.2d 27,"
42-44 (Alaska), cerx. denied, 385 U.S. 923 (1966); Wilhurn v.
Reitman, 54 Ariz. 31, 91 P.2d 865 (1939); Rnapp v, Fleming,
127 Colo. 414, 258 P.2d 489 (1953); Meeker v. Walraven, 72
N-M. 107, 380 P.2d 8^5, cert, denied, 375 U.S. 829 (1963);
Kellogg v Wilrov *f Wash. ?d 558 281 P.2d 677 (1955).
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STANLEi
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BRIEF OF APPELLANT

WTVM Of THg
This

CJH

- an appeal from a JjJ#fm*nt antare^r la^ plaintiff' s

fawor for libal relating to statements in t b % baott' BOna, against The
question palata

Storm*

ta action* and th*

clearly i*#«,*^ opinio** and coneluaiaat drawn by appallanft from th*
actions of plaintiff. Mayna madswortb ana) hit FAMILY
•<

^itn- jrfgajft* «**•
hit

CLIENTS

in

amtkiss ana) Campbell
FAMUT

cyxurra,

wayn. wadsworth's

frame Louis* S. Mann and Stanley (
Murder,

jfcj«fe*.1l& 4i^^-^"^-^ u'-'-1

or

fjfitac t*d^ *^rHI#lt^^^

Tha louar court rulad that cartaln ttatanants in tha book
ONE

AGAIMST

Tlfg STOP* MPT*

llbalOU*.

Nav designation

of which

statements were tha ones which- ware llaa-lou* eJere given ii, court or
to the defendant-appellant.

la«t seafca (1> Ha*. Vardlct; Set Aside.
(2) A Maw

(3)

A Change of Venue out of tha Third

Judicial 0

fr#TEftPT Qf ra^Tg

-2-

^eler

signed

lauid

taking

the

Mark

final

adoption

Neuiton W h e e l e r ,

Jd^^Neuiton

Wheeler

:t i i

and

reside^^

Mark Wayne Wheeli

Wayne

Wadsuiorth,

'^fevelerf

the

WadstAiorth.

Deposl t i o n

Mark

Newton

'In, 1 t

holidays

at

the

nine

monthi ol d

Court orl

1 f 1 , h i IM ^

together

197S C n M t a i t

four1 t h e ! ir

the S u p e r i o r

David

their

celebrate

papers

the

Wheel*
Within

i ake

State

ba< : 1 i: 1 J :
days,

CI t y

1 It ah

resident-

f^wte

i

Mark

fo
,t

I 'eb» | | 1 « r

,|

l1

!

i|IM rl

I • I' J

On Decewbe

:iif 1 9 7 S W a r k

Wayne Wheeler sign*

police

^^a^am.
5900 Canterbury Driua #30S» C u l v a r ^ H y , California (tha apartnant
of Silvi Ingabrlgtsan).
I

C! mi in 3 a ,11 iiii, iiiiiii in i

I

ItTi

from Mark Wayne Wheeler.
entered on December .

3 il il

A fin

WM

i iii (U

ieere*

•lar filad for diuor
Llvd^ce teas Issued and
#f California, of

by tUft Sup^rtW

Wheeler I
ef tevid fttrb

$22S.OO monthly for the

leler

^
In »

leptenber 4,

Wayne Mh#+1<
1976 in Salfe j i £ * Ctty^J

*«*^m
anything toward* tha

Whaalar

tha

I M I «onth Mark

Mayna Wha^fcr

of Bawld «ark *m*ton

paid

whaalar, ^Pur1»<;

in an airlina accident, Mark Mayna Whaalar nmvr

saw,

comnunicatad uAth hit adoptad son, avan though ha u*s amara of his

• 3-

whereabouts

and

had the means to do so.

hearing, JggT$-l

Custody

transcript of July 23, 1979 (letters and testimony) Stanl^PC. Mann
-

Pages

16-21. Mar jean

Leu is -

Pages 94-99, Gail TajiflpF - Pages

99-107, and Bishop Kenneth Peterson - Pages 107-112.
Stanley

C. Mann

filed

for

custody

of JBTid

Mark

Newton

Wheeler on the basis of abandonment of the chl^Vby the Guardian Ad
Litem.
(SUPP.

The statutes of the State of Utah ^ ^ 3 0 - 5 , Utah Code Ann
1953) further

support

PetitionerV^^laim

the child by providing that, if a p t i w
communicate

with that

child * for

has failed to support or

a^flfr'iod of one year or longer,

there is a presumption of abandonment.
court,* the Guardian

of abandonment of

In documents filed with the

Ad Litem, ^Trough* his brother-in-4af<attorney,

H. Wayne Wadsworth, denied Mf^T Wayne Wheeler mm* tnjelve (12) months
or more in arrears on supuflT to Dauid Mark Newton Wheeler
(1)

uent case

In a

(after «he custody hearing had
*

been concluded),
yne Wheeler gave testimony, that he was In
arrears on child
LAW,

prepared

In FINDINGS OF FUCT ftMD CONCLUSIONS OF

Wayne Wadsworth- and

Baldwin Jr.,
#(S)

port.

signed

by

Waatworth's f o m e r law partner

and (j

concluded

Nark

Wheeler

Judge

Ernest

F.

EXH. #17^. Page 2

Made

no attempt

to

exercise

mm- rights no paid court ordered child support for
twenty-ojp^«£jaa*0^ak
(2)

The

Superior

Court

of

California,

County

of

Los

>s, ruled In November of 19«0, that Mark Wayne Wheeler was in
»ars twenty-two (22) Months on court ordered support and levied
pudgment for the same to the Joan Newton Wheeler estate.
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Custody
tftH^testaine
me

David Mark Newton yheeler under

oulsloi i ol " tl le 2
Wad suior t h

(Detail*

his

s ni i 'i ] "f sought foi

di d

ewton Wheeler w i l l

i e s • ai c Ii

a ba i ido i Hie i 11,

on Page ! I i ne 9 EXH #18. however Mr

Memorancfcro Decision

EXH II •

i i i 11 ig

remain

with

custody

hi » \

!

1 s 1 .he

which

Wadsuiorth continued

2 3 • u f • uli in m , • •I I

"m
. i |l agl||8 > Judge <! * •.» f I s t a t e s :

wherei*

and Mi

i ii

J ,

t noted,

the Nanns

1 979,

the main 'basis,

" i1 r *"i f

t

„. $ • I 7 ,

* ht»

if

cl t:i 1 d

to

assert

allege<Artandonmnt or desertion of

contest between a natural parei^Land another, the sole question for

her conduct has forfeit*<i
cases

abandon me nt mayfa§ 11 i e
i

inflexioie
determined
facts 1 4

and each

Q i K1 y
doim i I1)!1

3 a3 d
must

t a I hi i
je for

:M I

iiiii >

determined

llcl1!

fuch

be decldecMon

its

No

ii i
own pari I

*

Having ruled t h a t , due process requinRkthat the Manns have

transcript
rejected
i I I ».i ' ,

case

III!

parental

Fii | • 2" 02 and 203, Wayne Wadsworth r e ^ t i f l e d ::i is JIIII ^ was
by

tl te

coui t.

Mr.

u+ to quo

Ii,

Wayne Wads worth ^ d

tatenent

•

memorandum d e c i s i o n which d e a l s only with i t e s t a *
uardian which provides

that "

ll

his

family

^ k a # Croft* s
-y dnpintmei it

a testamentary

appl^Q^tment

in which

the will is probated,

if before acceptance, both

paints

are dead or the surviving parent is adjudged incapacitated11 ^ n d they
give

this as the reason

conspired

that Stanley

to kill Mark Wayne Wheeler.

within hours of the alleged attempt
Silvi

C. Mann and

Wheeler

made

the

following

Louij^ S. Mann

The night of ^k

shooting,

on Mark Wayne Ji^eler's life,
allegation

tq^Fhe

Los

Angeles

Police department. (1) Quoted the statement MrjefHadsworth continues
to allege* citing the above, that the only j ^ J we could get custody
of

David

Mark

incapacitated.

Newton

Wheeler

was

^Kat

Mark

was

dead

or

(2) That whomever had^Ristody of David Mark Newton

Wheeler would have control of the tofllt moneys.

(3) Stanley C. Mann

was the only person they had ev^Phad' any difficulties ml* disputes
with and who might want Mark Whener dead.
The
memorandum
contrary
Wheeler

first

of
to

and

absolutely
given March

statement*^.*

Judge Croft^

has
false

no

EXH » 23,
in

the provj

disputed

Jflrsis

ac^rding

In

by reading

the

The

statement

the will

and

fact.

The

to Mark

Wayne

second

complete
is

trust of Joan Newton
third

Wheelers

statement
own

was

testimony

12, MSI), with Wayne Wadsworth preterit as counsel, in
i MET

numerous incidegff!io*luding rage 8 thru 25 and Page 31 thru 36, and
subsequent
actions

^djbrmation

uib^th were

that

in the

cane

forth

regarding

various, legal

process at the tlae which

resulted

in

judgmenj^against Mark Wayne Wheeler.
On Friday, December 29, 1978, within hours of Joan Newton
WhaWler's death, Mark Wayne Wheeler contacted United Air Lines.

^t

nsuranc

beneficiary,

etc

He was refused

ormation

vjDasis that United Ai i Il ::l i ies had It! • ei i ::l i is I ,i i IIIc I ,HI • cl 11 i m m r i ting by

anyone,
Ma

« -l Ik3 I circumstances ,

U^N^f

MheelftJI^iadt

this

IIII : :^ :^ in • i(i: It:

« ^ . ™* attempts, m

Stanley

Mann.

— ^ —± • u t i l e *

Mark

t :» ge I

ii RS sitf
:: JanSSlk 22

E)::l sli : ii

::: 'Il

1 979, " Hr

Kerry Heinz

the Manr^j^uiard) , t •ported

(at that time the

II • conversation

which 1 , i 1 i , I

wherein the Wheelers ha^i&old Bishop Treu that they were going I o
break

the will of Joan fUtoton Wheeler
V \

i

and that by *fv*ig

Silvi

•

of the t r u s t money and d i s s o l v e ^ t o e t r u s t according to the provision
f ounci

then

in i IP a g e 2 in ii

the

trust

Joan NeuUrn W W ^ e r ' l t a i l l , >are***ph-#4

thJAfraa
guardians and-*ta»|^,«aj|fl|Bt faadly •
According t<^ t»» EXM #11 l a t t a r s

to tha guardians

and banaflt
February

^rn^r-^m

197*.

Stewart.

of
14,

" 27,

non*?iC*Et* tftt^kha

firm of

ij'i

provided herein for TOjk care < il ' my nil lor - c
hlldr.n

s h a l l taralnata ami s h a l l fea d l s t r l b u t J l y f e n t l r c l y

and March 9.

i

Mart ttayna Whdalar

Young ami Paxton for

tha
1979
1979.

alraady^toqaaad tha law
tha purpoaa

o%^chall«nging

tine 18-20 t r i a l t r a n s c r i p t . Wayna Wadsworth danlas Mark Whknar's

-7^7a»,

actions.

All of tha above actions occured

prior to the alleged

attempt on Mark Wayne Wheelers life, (which the conspirators alleged
was

perpetrated

by

tha

Manns

to

accomplish

tha

very

thing

they

already were attempting to do)
Sometime in lata March I did inform Mark Wayne Wheeler that
I was moving the trust money into Western Marketing Resources Inc.,
stock.

I felt that in order to accomplish tha request made by Joan
*

Newton Wheeler of me, verbally, in her last will, and in letters, it
would

be

judicious

to

invest

tha

money

in

Western

Marketing

Resources, Inc., as she had reqyeated at an earlier pariod of time.
I did
Liapis,

make

later, on July
an

offer

to

la, 1979, through my attorney, Paul

tha

Guardian

Ad

Litem, -through

his

attorney, H. Wayne Wadsuorth, to put tha trust fund in a Corporate

I made this mffmr

in order to determine If thair real

interest was In »alftta4ftin« th* security af tha trust or getting
access to the money. aatf^X alee had) become very concerned regarding
my ouat aacui

and at our tmm.
lite was

the office

ntng an* abusive

began to

« r 3m*« a^idjppf^durina one ef these calls, my

threateaaiim£B""T!ta last

of June

1979, upon my

attorneys

returj^aapur-tfalifornia to take depositions relative to the custody

8

burglary and the forging of checks of Mark Mayne Wheeler's neighb^#
through a deposition taken by H. Wayne Wadsworth.
Mr. Wayne Wadsworth's

In respor^^rto

question, Mrs. Norma Waldroan, a ne^ffor

the Wheelers testified relative to this incident.

of

Sh^flPEated she

had reported the incident to the Wheelers and Mark uMeler told he
he thought if might be in connection with the unjmWwho
to

get

custody

of

David Mark

was trying

Newton Wheeler^flr Sometime

later 1

learned that on June 20, 1979, Wayne Wadsw^fln, of and for Watkiss
and

Campbell,

Attorneys

for

Mark

Wayne^^eeler,

had

caused

this

action to remove me as Trustee, to baflPlled in the Third District
Court, C-79-4063 EXH » 20 .
remove

me

as

trustee.

Item

P l e a s e ^ K e on Page 5 of this action to
H jjr

This

was

filed

w4€h-*H

Wayne

Wadsworth having prior knowledj^that his client was in violation of
the statute on abandonment^md

supposedly with no prior knowledge

that the statute of abatywiHint would ifr~ be considered;

enforced

nor upheld in the cout^#of Judge Ernest F. Baldwin Jr., during the
custody hearing scheduled for July 23, 1979.
The
was

only

Poller investigation

five^flseks

old,

and

of the

according

alleged
to

homicide

H. Wayne

attempt

Wadsworth's

deposition, ymmxx on f*truary 22 and 23, 19t2, ho has never had, nor
at that tlnM&Ld
that

a^pmpted

DetecUros

he have any evidence to link either of the Manns to
homicide,

and

admitted

that

the

Los

Angeles

had informed (not only him but his clients also), that

theujraid not have any evidence to link the Manns with an attempted
horaxide.

In spite of this, these charges were made in this trust

(©(lit EXH » 20 -and admitting that neither they nor the Los Angeles
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|Oolice detectives had any new evidence, Wayne Wadsuiorth and his
F m l y Client, the Guardian Ad Litem, caused to be filed on December
28, " ^ *

in the U. S. District Court for the District of Utah,

Central DMLsion, a Civil Action C-79-0772W which accused the Manns
again

of

t n l ^ attempted

homicide.

EXH

#

3J5

After

months

of

harassment, in JJLch there was a complete absence of any discovery,
all causes of this aktion were dismissed with prejudice, on a motion
by Mark Wayne Wheelerl^^fco Guardian Ad Litem.

(Two causes of action

were dismissed on July ^^kl9*0 and the- last cause of action on
August 4, 1980)

EXH # 10 an^fc^

Prior to the aboue i c ^ n
C.

Mann,

Louise

S. Mann

was

being dismissed against Stanley

m n

'a Summary

Honorable David Winder on May 21, l^fc-

Juclgmeadf by the

Immediately following the

hearing regarding the Summary Judgmenl^Wayne Wadsworth, acting on
behalf of the guardian Ad Litem, made 4naffer to ?r,e Manns to drop
all actions,
California,

(includirg
and

leave

the trust action!
Mr.

Mann

as

n - Utah, Colorado and

trull^,

without

further

harassment, on the condition that Stanley C. Mai^Land Louise S. Mann
would waive all claims or cause of action that l w «

may have for

libel, slander, or m*$l«lous prosecution against thiraHl Litem, Mark
Wayne Wheeler and any of his attorneys.

EXH #

27. (SwSLtestlmony

of attorney. Cordon L. Roberts) This was immediately decliwB^
Subsequently the Guardian' Ad Litem, Mark Wayne WheeJW^his
wife,

Silvi

Wheeler,

and

their

brother-in-law

attorney, Tfl&P*

Wadsworth, were found guilty of Malicious Prosecution by a jury T^
the Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County. Salt Lake

-10-

Civil
Mann

us

Similar
by

Mark
actions

C-80-9961,

Wayne

EXH #

W W e e T e r ^ a ^ j | B P P I S ^ r 5 r ^ and

a^^gMfl^l^^ayne

S t a Q ^ g p ^ T ^ Mann

are

Wadsworth

presently

Waylie~ Wads w o r t h

and Watkiss and Campbell

pending

in

the

Third

Judicial

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Defendant/Appellant's right of "Due Process11 as provided in
the U. S. Constitution

and

the Constitution of the State of Utah

mere violated by the refusal of discovery relative to issues vital
to

the

speech,

preparation
expression

of
of

his

defense.

beliefs,

*&*- rights

opinions, and

the

4f

freedom

right

to

of

enter

evidence critical to hit defense, including but not limited to his
rights of rebuttal to present evidence ef tft» continuing perjury of
the

plaintiff,

Wayne ttadsworth, haw*

been*' withheld.

Appellant's rights to a fair trial were W m i

Defendant/

by- an expression of

personal opinions state* by the Judge:
Defendant/Appe>)£*nt

believes

that

a

lie

told

in

court,

whether •dveytac* «bjgjgfc» t* still a lie. that all officers of the
court must? tif-neldr aSbwttable for statements Made in the courtroom
and in the^frleadireeitf which, are false and are known to be false at
the time uttered or^written, otherwise they haue violated the oath
taken at their *we*Fine 1 A and violated the integrity of'the court.
The Oefendant/nppellant believes that his authorship of the
book "One Against the. Storm", which was critical of some Third

-11-

District Court Judges, precludes the Defendant/Appellant being able
to receiue a fair trial in the Third Judicial District.

Defendant/

Appellant belieues Judge Dauid B* Dee and Judge Philip R. Fishier
intentionally,

as biased

individuals, refused

to allow Stanley

C.

Mann the discouery to prepare his defense and to enter euidence and
present

testimony

defense,

while

to

the

jury

allowing

which

opposing

mould

counsel

have
to

supported

use

those

his
same

»

information sources being denied Defendant/Appellant.

ARGUMENT

POINll

THE
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S
RIGHTS
TO
"DUE
PROCESS1* .GUARANTEED BY THE .FIFTH 4MENOMENT TO
THE
U.
S.
CONSTITUTION
AND . ARTICLE
I.
REPEATEDLY DENIED.
THE "EQUAL,* PHOTECTION"
CLAUSES
OF
THE
FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT
AND
ARTICLE I, SEC. 24 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
WERE
REPEATEDLY
DENIED.
THEREFORE.
THIS
TRIAL MAS EXTREMELY BIASED' AND JUDGMENT MUST
BE DISMISSED.
The

facts

are

clear

froei the

data

of the- first

set

of

Interrogator!**- me$$4g| to Mayna Wadsworth and hie attorney. Ray R.
Christensen, ttiat tho* would fo to any lengths to deny discovery
rights

to defendants^ even openly stating falsehoods in court, by

The DEFENDANT'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES TO Plaintiff.
Wavne Wadsmorth. mailed 29th of December

1961. mere never answered.

The DEFENDANT'S FIRST REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS to
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Plaintiff, Wayne

Wadsuiorth mailed

were never produced.

the 28th

day of December

1981,

A motion to compel discovery dated February 2,

1982 was filed and hearing on that motion was held on February 8,
1982

before

Judge

David

B,

Dee.

Ray

Christensen

alleged

did not pertain to my defense, which was

patently

i

interrogatories

went directly to the statements in the book "One Against the Storm",
which accuses Wayne Wadsuiorth of perjury*
mislead the court.

lying* and attempting to

The Judge never did m*ke a ruling.

Another MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY

AMD

FOR SANCTIONS was

delivered to Wayne Wadsuiorth*s attorney and the court on February 9,
1982, prior to another hearing before Judge David B. DtfRequesting
answers

to

Attached

to that motion was an example, clearly

legitimacy

FIRST

SET

OF

of 'Questions

INTERROGATORIES.

as^ed

in

r

the

numbers

1

thru

21.

demonstrating- the

interrogatories.

Ray

Christensen repeatedly said any question relating to P-79-2 in Third
District Court C-79-4063 in Third District Court and C-79-0772W in
U. S. District Court, wherein Wayne Wadsuiorth representing a FAMILY
CLIENT (so noted by Wayne Wadsuiorth in the courts) accused Louise S.
>Mann and Stanley C* H u m

of knowingly

lying. Conspiracy to Commit

First Degree Murder, and many other acts of moral turpitude, were

among

other*;. ..a* ^ottreaa^Xrbpf.yefticti

information
regarding

Stanley j.cr

HaVm ^g«¥f&red

g»owMJtti&ti"' n y . o*t«ds" hri'r . beliefs '" and. conditions

Wayne

Wadsuiorth •$

actions.

Due

process

is

absolutely

denied, if discovery into matters involved around those suits (which
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Wayne Wadsworth filed for his FAMILY CLIENTS) is not allowed. | P
****

Willi!

U'lf

HllllfW

Wm***a**aeg&UmmmmmWm

IIPJ

"nil, rii M l

See Stanley

Ml knowingly

C. Mann

letter and

accompanying attachments sent to Judge David B. Dee, dated November
25. 1983. EXH. #

3 .

I went to the expense of having that one

hearing transcribed for the purpose of drawing to the attention of

Judge David B. Dee that mmmmmmev^^Fim

Sherlock,

Attorney

for Stanley

11W**" *****

C. Mann filed another MOTION TO

COMPEL DISCOVERY. '' A hearing was field September 7, 1982. before
Judge Philip R. Fishier.

On October 4, 1982', Judge Fishier issued

an order, Item number 4 of that order stated: "That defendant's
motion to compel discovery is continued to a date when court and
counsel

can make a detailed

review

of the Interrogatories and

request for production to which objections have been filed".

t H

1983, Stanley C. Mann, pro se., wrote a letter to Judge David B. Dee
with a copy of the transcript of the hearing held in his court on
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February 9, 1982 and pages 281 and 282 of a deposition taken twelve
days

later

by

attorney,

E. Scott

Savage,

of Wayne

Wadsworth on

February 23, 1982, gluing irrefutable evidence that B | B 9 i ^ | M i l P 0 0

mini fin r i r r r r n nim"iiinn n im

^ i

j i

i*«r JRHT

MHNMHeMBBM.^^
#
8,

3 .

EXH

The evidence was ignored and never addressed.

1983, Stanley

C.

Mann

pro

*#., served

on

On December

Wayne

DEFENDANT'S SECOND SET OF INTERROGATORIES TO PLAINTIFF.
9.

1984

PLAINTIFF'S

INTERROGATORIES

were

ANSWERS
filed.

TO

DEFENDANT'S

, The

answers

were

SECOND

Wadsworth
On January
SET

OF

superficial

and

deceptive, in that they just deny, without answering the questions
in detail as asked.

On December 16, 1993, Stanley C.*tiaflfc, pro se,
aw

served

on Wayne Wadsworth DEFENDANT'S

103 REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS.
noted in the s

REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS WITH

EXH » 2* . numbers 67, 68, 4 6* as

tements in the body soothe document/-)

simple denial of- UH|tj|Peque*t for admission would certainly not be
burdensome
requests

to
for

a

eerttf*

admission,

if

it were

all

are

not

clearly

se.

The remaining

identifiable

by

99

Wayne

Wadsworth and his counsel as being related to the cases, wherein he
represented "his FAMILY CLIENTS, and the sources identified in the
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back

of

the

218-221.

book,

The

"One

the Storm11.

Against

Q8JECTION

TO

DEFENDANT'S

EXH #

REQUEST

34. Pages

FOR

ADMISSIONS

signed and served by Wayne Wadsuiorth's counsel, Ray Christensen, on
January

17, 1984, is

••••••••^IgB
law.

Each

used

request

t0

deprive Stanley C. Mann of due process of

for

admissions

could

have

been

denied

or

admitted in far less time than the answers Stanley C. Mann gave to
Wayne

Wadsuiorth's

requests.

attorney,

Ray

Christensen

in

answering

all

Statement in Ray Christensen*s MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF

OBJECTIONS TO DEFENDANT'S REVEST FOR ADMISSIONS, also dated January
I98** ( • • • • • • • M H H N L M

"*

review

the requests will clearly show that they do not by and i*rge relate
to the
between

issues of this case, but rather
these

Wadsworth,

parties11.

This

is

clearly

to other cases pending
not

the

case.

Wayne

N

of and "for Watkiss and '6ampbeIV* filed suits, arranged

for other lawyers to file suits and re#*atrent the Wheelers (his
4

relatives), as well as, negotiated the terms ef the legal service,
arranged for the advance of moneys from tha accounts of Watklss and
Campbell to the other attorneys, prepared documents and had those
fuarantaa paynant for aarvlcas to tha other
documents ^**fne*>
attornaya\

16

Both of these cases resulted from Wayne Wadsworth's
actions in representing his FAMILY CLIENTS.

The book "One Against

the Storm" tells this story and lists in the back of the book the
major sources of this information.
Mann, pro se..^yfrued
FOR

On January 30, 1984, Stanley C.

ANSWER TO OBJECTIONS TO DEFENDANT'S-rREftJ EST

ADMISSIONS AND MOTION TO COMPEL.

the second

Attached to the motion (for

time) to the attention of Judge Dauid B. Dee,

EXM •
Wayne
relevant

when

Wadsmorth,

himself,

he

C-79-0772W.

filed

made, all
EXH

#

of these
35

.

other
by

suits

including

information from these suits as part of his complaint.

On February 7, 1984, Stanley C. Mann pro se, prepared three
motions.
1. MOTION TO DISMISS FPU FAILURE TO PROSECUTE.
FOR

EXPEDITED TRIAL SETTING.

3. MOTION

2. MOTION

FOR HEARING ON MOTION TO

DISMISS AND MOTION TO COMPEL, (which mat still pending from January
30, 1984).

The hearing mas held before Judge *5avid B. Dee, on March

2, 1984.

Argument mas heard on my motion to compel.

he mould

take it under advlseiifont.

Judge Dee said

I stated to Judge

Dee "I am

going to be given due process of lam, mhich includes the rights to
discovery or I mill have no choice but to file a suit against Wavne
Wadsuiorth, Ray Christensen. and Judge Dee himself, othermise I could

-17-

not defend myself,M

I asked for immediate rights of discovery and

an expedited trial setting, or that the suit be dismissed for lack
of prosecution.

At this point. Judge Dee looked at his calendar,

and after some discussion, set the trial date for June 6, 1984,

W

I heard nothing from Judge Dee during the next
week* then on Monday, March 12, 1985, I received a letter from Judge
Dee, dated 'March 2, 198*,^ postmark** March 77 198*, EXH »
kA-t

**

3 .

>

There is nothing in this lette/^that Judge Dee, Wayne WadsworthV*and
in all likelihood, Ray Chri*,tensen had' not knoum for a number of
years prior to the first hearing in this case. This all mas after 1
had

been

denied

a

preliminary

injunction,

rwm±*4f

*

discovery

requests, and denied a Chang* of Venue, which had been requested on
tha basis of judicial blaa.

9aa AFFIDAVIT OF STftWLEV C. HaMN IN

SUPPORT OF HOTIOW TO CHUMGI UEMUE.

EXH # * £ _ • r *r". Christensan

adamantly objected to a Chang* of Venue oil ctha" basis Mr. Wadsuiorth
had a right to b* judged by hi* p**r«.

For tiao (2) years Judge

Dee. Wayn* Wadsuiorth? amd Rap Carls ti»n tan completely concaalad the
relationship that exit*** Midi* Judg* 0mm'a ruling* added cost of
thoua«n4^.ndttpi^^flHpi upwsslmry o»p*nt* %» mm. In pursuing my
rights of;3lfeoMar)p^3w my attempts to get a change of venue.
order

*i9mgl&±T~,&*&

'Defendant ~mma*r

******

*>•• am, .March

2,

1M2.

item

The

2 states:

* —**f» TO c — « L Qisearetv is l* taken

under advisement pendingv reviam by tha ceurt of PEFENOAMT' a- REQUEST
FOR ADMISSIONS.

It sh*uld b* n*ted In Judge Dee's letter that he

never did lrsue an order one way or the other on my HOTIOW TO COMPEL
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DISCOVERY.

It

continued -to be ignored

without a formal decision

-4
ever

filed.

MOTION FOR

On March

14,

1984, attorney

RECUSAL AND FOR SPECIAL

Robert

Sherlock

filed

ASSIGNMENT TO TRIAL JUDGE, and

. iLaSpbsted JDdge Judith Billings would be appropriately assigned to
the matter as she had no connection to the defendants nor had she
been Trt^lued

with

any

suit

involving

defendants.

In

Mr.

Ray

Q^rJU*0tuenU ^lottor^to^Judge vrn¥ regarding this matter, dated March
21, 1984, Mr. Christens#^^A^^ctecr to Mr. ^Sherlock's suggestion on
the basis the defendants would
very

be hand picking a judge.

In the

same letter to Judge Dee, Mr. Christensen made the following

comment:

"Judge Fishier has heard

some motions in connection with

this, case and therefore has had soma prior contact uAChr'it and if
^*ff^Judge is to bo specially assigned to try this, ho would seem to
- *s

i

US to be tin .B»*t^loric>r1lhotc*',>.- It appears tay Christensan and
Mr. Wayna

Wadsuiorth were

tha

onas '%uccess^U>; in. porsonally

picking thair own judge who had haard two wealds.

hand

(11. MOTION FOR A

CHANGE OF UENUE - which ha daniad aftar Ray Christensen's adamant
argument that Wayno Wadsworth had a right to bo judgad by his
uihara

ha

resided.

(2)

HOTIOil

TO

COMPEL

continued and noflfjto| wat ever issued.

DISCOWEKY

-

which

p*er$
he

At tho tiae Judge Fishier

was assigned to tho case permanently and an expedited date of trial
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I had no choice but to go
ahead, belleuing as my attorney advised met that he mould be able to
bring out the facts uie knew during., the trial.

Because of the

nature of my business and the

In spite of the
declaration

by Mr.' Chrlstensen thtft discovery into Civil P-79-2,

C-79-4063, C-79-0772W

(uiherein Mr. Wayne' Wadsworth and his Family

Client had charged my wife and myself with Attempted First Degree
Murder)

a C-Sl-8644

were

not

related

to

Chrlstensen opened the subject of P-79-2.

this

Libel

suit, Mr.

See page 25, line 23

through Page 27. line 13 and on Page 27, line 14 through 20 of libel
trial transcript.

Wadsworth

**•. Chrlstensen opened the subject of C-79-0772W
__.
^_
that Wayne

* W gUtlLY CLIENTS had alleged in that suit during his

opening stat««£n* in,., t h t ^ W i t r j W , , „ . . J J i p p

-20-

against Stanley
I I" 1

1 " • Ii

M a I I in in iwj t I ni prejudlc nil!faj i 1 1 i n Honorable Jud g ill! • I ) • ii , jii id

198 0

Again
relating

t o t h e Material

conferring
point

with

Mr. Christens •i

his client,
defendant11 i

cif " \ .1 le

Il ^ IIII oi

Wayne Wadatiiorth)
knowledge

:i insisted

attempted

uias not

t o make

relati<#%# t * c e r t a i n

things
f

brought

=j

depositions
Mr.

i

il I • >•

.ybjact

•I

May it*

Uadta*rth • i

taken March 12. and March, r:

Wadsworth

t e s t i f i e r il

1 9*0

FHWlLt

" Il m ^ ^ : i i i .i > C-79-0772W.

il /ill! IIII "1 , Stanley C. Mann iw is present tuhi i i til i »s- i

d#potltl*a*-. wmm* *****m£B "* • * * * have kneatt- c t n t m thing* .
Trial

Il I 1
il 1,1 ^ ! il t

transcri|rt/

1 j n* 1 2„1

CLIEHT'S

(1 " Il Il 11

f0(m 417, beginning :i i i Il il in in 22 ^ IIII mi through Page
I

Eu< ^

il 1, < - il , siiasiii

§f

Stanley C. Mann teas present does not mean
mat accy*

-2i-

Aftor Mr;*Chrlston»<in conferred with Wayne Wadsworth,
the following exchange took place ." " (Page *18 - Vine 1 through line
12 (Libel Trial Transcript).
Q.

(Mr. Chrlstensen) War* those deposition* taken?

A.

(Mr. Wadsworth)

Q.

Wo are talking now about the depositions of Mark and

Ye* Sir, they wore.

Sllwl Wheeler.
A.

Yos Sir.

Q.

And those wore in connection with what is called "The
Federal Case?

A.

Yes Sir.

Q.

In those depositions or in the deposition of Mark
Wheeler, firet of all. Did'Stanley Mann attend that
deposition.

A.

Do you retail?

Yes. ho did.
T (Libel Trial Transcript).

(Again- on
Q,

And at that deposition

you say Mr. Mann attended the

deposition of Mark wheeler.

&MM^£%£Z*9f:

.«»»..-<** .—
v

:*dJb£ -•wky.

Mr. M*tfs«orth told a blatant

;Ile^rfHe.^a^^^^
haue yefy-^asily. verified this%nfdriation before using this false*'
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Way na Wad tu»orth mi i m $ i m • pra s antad
uy

Ray Christansan

against hi» 5

frow

Louisa

Mann

filesT her.,*jwit

N i j _ .,

nave' been

tgtally

that

interrogator!*

tha

tha tliM

! : : tha If

dishone*

il

******* ^ ***<«*<

representation- -to

iii dmi s aloha

wane

not

the^-car-^

re1euant*

>rgumants- :JI n f rout »©.£, Judao F i l h l e r Wiat

material

:

tha a c t i o n s
C-79-4063 ,

ui *?
C -7f-f772»

«f$»*

^

»

-

>

'v>

•

' •

^

"

;

J

I a n d t h e o u t c o m e o I ill i a a t i l l i

Il •>. "IJ1-/,

not

Ajowded

relevant.

See

lauised

Conplaint C - i l « i « 4 * f i l e * fry
Wadsuiorth on tto* 12tfe*«f August 1912
Item

III il |

comp

and

themselves
lie tc nowledged

made those three
->*

case

c omplain t . In item

^ *r

HP

stat

f*L

l%h£^Ap9k

mentioned. abou* '

refers
Wadsuiorth and S" s i1 Chr l i t e n s e n r e a l i z e
ir

admi s s i o n s a • i r a 1 a! 11 i g 1 o

Wayne MadsuiortI it s actions and t: n
: > answer those interroga o Hi e s

honestly,

would

have

proven

Wayne

Wadsworth's

guilt

of

every

Allegatiott*,~~©pinioir and assumption uihrlch I made regarding him In the
book*"One Against the' Storm".

The only chance of a defense Was to

hid*;, information, deceive, abuse the judicial system and continue to
.give False- testimony -under oath.

T**o rulings df the "courCiniouied

«them~~£o deny diVcovery, which enabled theaMEo continue^ this**Travesty
of the court.
Discovery was requested properly under Rule 33. 34 and 36
of

the

URCP

and

denial

of

this

discovery,

by itself,

grounds for overturning the results of this trial.
In

furtherance

of

denial

of

-24-

due

process.

should

be

•**

-25-

• ; • * .^*jn*a**

-A . i F v Ji;

:*»*>.•

•s <*&-*

^xt^^m^^^^^^^^t^^.

**>«*-*-

4gBr^r^;..;ssB:rvj

**^£v^Z^-lMSjfk
9

•

(Mr

^, i**5lstejfisen>

Mr ^

* < • • *'• * ~ » ••***•-•*!£* *4js* *

Wadsworth; ~fthe> **ftfSA"» any

complaints filed; against ••^v':h^T-^Vy9tdhiWf^^'^^'^'^SSlt
series of litigation^.

of

^

f>*^^IV^i|l h * w « Y^"*^** «"y disciplinary. proceedings -«fainst~you in
the Utah State Bar?
A.

•

None, or anywhere else.

..„=INM1«M«.J*-:

26-

'

•

*

-

•

•

•

*

,

.

*

*

!

»

'

&.. .One
over

of

t ha

i, ruling

"

produce

is ,

more

4 M b t then

•

•

blatant

denials

at, i si mrsal

• :i ii

di § • ' p r o c e s s : - o c c u r r e d

Il iJlli m

] i III i" -i u l i h g • by"" . Jt idge

-

111 e 111r

wh1 c In

c o n t a i nad

infomatio n

"

all 1 communication want
letter

oI

during tha

through

Way ne

Wad suio r t h

iii1

-*T

count*

til i< i o r d e r e d *

I

|: i ' :: ^ :il i : i ill 1: I ^ 3

I I n i Robart' r S h e r l o c k t e n d e r e d

lunctt*feraak

ma s

«c t o

the

•

meeting
letter

::li

III ' :

:ha*bars#
1: i >

' : : ii it iii .ii ^ : i ,1 , a > jll

25

11 agi

Judge

:i tint reduced*

Flshla

but

ii

"I • 1 ^

did
Sum

lio*af$»£ thru

1 S i .ill ' , 2 C)

Il Il

.Chri*fc*n**n

testimony

Judge

fishier

determine

the1

not

what

was

going

than

even want

the

1 allow
n

though

ensued

contents

tha

> s t a t e d l e t t e r would 11 icit lb 1 ^ tmembered lb 1 1 ' i 1 te j i ii" 1 *
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1

Il "il ^ ^

:I

letter

Judge

il Il e

il , : > I : 4 ^

( 1 1 -1 1

argument

1 ffusecf

Pa f t
hims*

' Il < > III l l o u i i n g

I: mi 11 .11 1 > I I I ^ 1:1 ill

1" >

did

ncillated

ill: 1 11 1 1

Il 11: .1

i ill

III

FUk'!dr
See rage

^ 4 5 3 / ^ l i O M * . 1» "tftPtcW.-^-On* P«g«r-#i2. 'lines

210-20,

Judge

Fishier

**-<* *wj *«*•*"•»

communicated

to

the

jury

that

the

letter

was

produced:

frfayne
Wadsuiorth,
CLIENT'S

himself,

deposed

Dr.

Robert

Marshall,

his

FAMILY

pediatrician, on June 28, 197*.

>*-*

. * * ! „

il••{,; f * f

**"

* i

; J?!*.-

/•

.t.

^

THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S RIGHTS TO FREEDOM OF
SPEECH. STATEMENTS Of BELIEF ANO/Ot OPINIONS.
GUARANTEED IV THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE U. S.
CONSTXmfXON AN© ftRTICLE I . SEC. IS OF THE
• , ' I I W I I I L M P I M °* ^ A N . ***** REPEATEDLY DENIED.
THCRE1MK BEING DEPRIVED OF DISCOVERY AND
' EMTRANOC: OF
RELEVANT
EVIDENCE
AT TRIAL.
^ OEFENOAWt-APPELLANT MAS NOT AILE TO SHOW SOUND
ARRIVING AT HIS BELIEFS AND/OR
*r* ft£ASOf£jfeR
E N I C « i i WHICH HE STILL RIGHTFULLY HOLDS.
THEREF«*r JUDGMENT MUST BE DISMISSED.
An action for libel per %• must allege * statement falling
Into on* of four categories:

It must state that the complainant has

committed a crime; it mutt directly injure the complainant in his

-28-

t r a d e or pro f e $ s 1 o n;
impute u n c h a s t l t y

!i ,11 Ill

IIIII n a t i o n s

trade

ill Jil ijllli it

ii

alleged

libel

injur y

:. it jii IIIII lb iiiiiii

ii i :i i:

111
III ,

IIIII •

IIIII ,

tot

(Utah

:t ::l oi i

alleged

tli •

plaintiff

ac p r o v e n ,

par

construed

lii it tII iii sit :iii , st> ii '

:l I ti

1 ,.II ^ 3 ^

the

libel

. lo IIIII :: ill ^ v it rill
presumad

from

the

according , to

has

t i s 4 ill ,1 i i -

must

common

words

4 4 5 - 2 - 2 U.C.ft.
III

be l i b e l

notoriety

alone" .

lleged

i tin

that

ftlffea**

nor

v

the
Cook,

'

t h a i it

lis i |. ii

popular,

and

Common

1966).
1 IIIIIII it

languagi • 111 i
l i b e l per

Court

yoman,

tit an a t t o r n e y it/l „ 111 aw

. i

t0

IIIII

::::: i

:: I il ,1 ^ iii!! complaint clearly allege that the statement

damages

III

i m p u t a a 111 o i , t I i s o mi a cl 1 $ a a s a:::

1,1 t111e c o m p l a i n a n t :1 s

: i profession,
Ii i

i t »• •«

app l y i n g

thaaa

• capable

IIIIIII IIIIIII '

of

rules

I: JIIIII i

IIIIIII •

::i ' if

1 IIIII in it

IIIII

^ iia ^ it 1 1 u a t i o n s

Jill .i i t e r p n t a t i o n s ,

iiimi one which may not oe n o e i

has followm** t*e position that sucl

par

ont

IIIIIII IIIIIII

,

of

:f

which

statement (capable

damages must be plead and proven. Allred v. Cook, supra.
It It well established'Utah law that statements of belief
°r opinion, denominated at such by the speaker or writer, ar« not

P2d 22? (Utah 1976").

may

(J it III ^ l ( tiiiiiti Jim 3' ttip •! *

more than on* interpretation) cannot be libel per se. and special

actionable as libel or slander.

1'

Qgden Bus lines v K.3.L.. Inc bbl

In this this case the Utah Supreme Court

upheld

both

Article

the

1. Sec.

First
15 of

Amendment

to the U. 3. Constitution

the Constitution

of Utah,

M

The

and

right of

comment is not restricted to a statement of the naked facts.

As a

general rule it may include the right to draw inferences or express
opinion from facts established.
opinions

The soundness of the inferences or

is immaterial whether they are right or wrong, provided

they are made in good faith and based upon truth."
In applying these wall established rules of Utah law to the
allegations of tha Revised Amended Complaint in this action, it is
clear that, in the absence of proof of special damages (which the
plaintiff, in tha pretrial order has admitted does not exist), the
following alleged statements are clearly no libel ?*r sow*
MATURj OF STATjftSMT

REASON

10 (A)

Mann's belief that matter
would be dropped

Statement of opinion
opinion or belief. Does
not. Allege champerty or
barratry. .
«XH #141 Pg. 183-187.

10 (B)

Statement that doctor's
testimony was 'bought'

Opinion ("seemed")
Statement
was
"it
seemed
to
me"
Ambiguous
usage
of
language.
Slang
expression
properly
designated as defined
In Mobster's New World
Dictionary. Page 1682
under Quotation marks
EXH
#
12
under
correct and commonly
accepted English.
EXH # 34. Page 42.

(10) (C)

Misdirecting court

Ambiguous,
(What is
misdirecting)?
EXH # 34. Page 42-60.

10 (D)

Dirty tricks

Ambiguous,
(What
is
misdirecting)?
EXH # 34, Page 160-161

SUBPARAGRAPH
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SUBPARAGRAPH

113

t r%

NATURE OF STATEMENT

REASON

i* E ^

wadSii*ortr, * s ) IIII i 3: : ^ i , 1

character.

profession; statements
of opinion9 and
ambiguous

Not dlractad to

t T \

Opinion concerning

Opinion
im #_3 * I ' g I S • 8 2 31
States nothing.about
Plaintiff, Ambiguous
opinion
aboutf Mark
Wheeler's
employment.
EXH » 34 Pag« 204-207.

a 111ra11 on% , to recc • i ; ifl li

Occurrence in front of

*iO"<K'>

-^.—Federal Court

• Each of these subparagraphs falls to meet the requirement s
! or clear §

unambiguous language capable of only'" one interpretation
i

standards IF i in

l i b e l per se under Utah lam

1:1: wa i 4>ejjp error

il ,. : >

allow such a l l e g a t i o n s to become t h e ' s u b j e c t of Jury d e l i b e r a t i o n s .

Mann and
Murder.

Stanley

C

ii

:i il " IIIIIII /ttempttrff

An a l l e g a t i o n which I t f a l s i

themselues t

t o ~tom&L' F i r s t

Degree

I f W*f ut Watfaworth and I s

they would not have dismissed with prejudice the

o»t iiii ^

:

'*-*. iip

) ' ' ^ r ^ # M a d s w o r t h and" hit FAMILY CLIENTS knew of the evidence

3i-

The evidence which has come forth suggests Wayne Wadsworth
and

his expert uiitness kne|* the shooting was going to take place

before it happened and had already gathered Information to point to
Louise S. Mann and Stanley C. Mann in their attempt <&o*djframe them.
In

Wayne

Wadsworth's

own

wordt

"Any

innocent

nan

everything brought out in the open to clear himself.
Wads worth
System

the

and

early

mmmmmmmmmmmVmmVmmmml
permit discovery,

hours

after

di»contimm?

abating

would

want

Until Wayne
the

Judicial

the Defendaifi/ftppellant will continue

midnight, Wayne Madsworth admitted

past the"Mann's home to check on them.
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driving

Three days later on Monday,

11

S

III "! ,1 ! • •• i jii •

] ::i i 11 :::i i i 3 i 1 1 IIIIII

Renchler

I lai 1 1 is
* * k€

HHHHHHttHBH^
belief

and a s s e r t s

that

• , •I

CI • I • i il ' Deputy

Sherlf I

Shephe r

t 0 • 1 1 1 mi 1 hooting .

defendant/appe 1 1 a 1 1 (: t i g I 111 1 11 1 y 1 1o "1 ct s 11
any judgment

b e l i e f s , before our presentl

bi ought agair is t: I iii 1 il c

I ::l s

11 JI ' 111 - unjust and must be dismissed.
POINT I I I

B*ASN.
*I5L£ADING,
JUDG£
FIS||L£R
mog
A
INFLAMMATORY AND UNJUDICIAL STATEMENT IN THE
COURT ROOM,
On July 2S ., 19«4» opening day of- the t l a ] Ill il • • : • Ill J 1
Ill ' ' ' ill
*

«

« *

: "( : 1) ' jur iit.t;
- * >

• • • »

'

•

. . . . . .

:•

'

•••>'•

The Court:

" i i deals with

uage f 44 tiler made the roilowing s t a t e m e n t :

. ^ - M . w , .

W.

Ladles and Gentlemen, the Book O i W against the

the legal profession in' Utah

is there anyone

either more truthful than the populac 1 •• 1 • 1 it whole?"
||U|H

f

f » § III Ill Ill)

Iij! 1 11 ill 11

here

II 1 cm I eel LhaL

I I III 111 I I I (Ill

(Paute in preeeeaings).

The'Court:

I. e t tl 1 IIIIII • record show 1 1 ::i I lands are r a i s e d ,

(Whereupon,

furthr

EXH # 13 .

•i i 1 1 lammatory *

The opinion

'

{p iroceedlngr 1 1 1 IIIIII 1 ' IIIIII h a d bu K „ 1 i' ::: Ill: I 1 11 111 11

expressed

of uiha t the

book I s . about it 1

iitatement ::l 1 111 ,1 1 affront t :::i» till le attorneys and

judges which were spoken well of In the book.
communicates

a bias, defenslue attitude unbecoming and void of the

judicial^:4emean^
statement

The statement openly

to

puts every

conduct

a

fair

trial.

That

prospective juror on the defensive to ujaiW&ld

the integrity of an entity of his state and home, which he has pride
in.

Anyone

who

had

remotely

acquainted

remained

were

individual, who

read

with

those

the

it, was

only

by his

whether deserving or not.

book

excused

exposed

very

themselves,

title

to

the

from

or who
the

biased

and position

was

panel.
opinion

commands

even
What
of

an

respect,

Although the book was entered on the last

day of trial,
POINT IV
JUDGE
FISHIER
VIOLATED
THE
DEFENDANT
/APPELLANT'S PRIEST-PENITENT PRIVILEGE
Judge Fishier violated this privilege*-on the basil a copy o
the letter to Elder Ezra Taft Benson was sent to Charles C. Mann,
who Judge Fishier states "was not a member of a recognized cl*rgyM.
Charles C. Mann was a participant in the meeting in Elder Marion D.
Hank;s office, referred to in the book and the letter.

Charles C.

Mann was at the ecclesiastical meeting going on between President
Robert Barker and Blellep Kerry Heinz at the time of my phone call to
Bishop Heinz (which meeting was taking place at the time of the call
and the sam» meeting^ referred tp in the letter to Elder Benson.
Charles
Mr.

C. Mann was at that meeting

Sherlock

not

being

a

member

in an ecclesiastic
of

the

LDS

capacity.

faith

and/or

understanding his capacity at that meeting, no only couldn't explain
it to the court, but couldnft understand it.
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However, it was proper

ecclesiastic/LDS

Church

procedure • f ci IIIII Il i jl i mi IIIII Ill ::i • lb IIIII •• copied

:: • i III i ,h i t

pill i t ::l ii i t Ill lose two ai id mai ly a ill " tl in

other meetings which took place regarding this matter.

PLAINTIFF# WAYNE WADSWORTH GAVE PERJURED
TESTIMONY ( T Til I •Il
Wayne Wadsworth has ma d IIIII IIIII s i g n i f i c a n t

Manns had a motivi

il a • ii 1 laiill „ Mark Wheeler.

issue

ji 111 , ( Il 1 1 11 i t

Wayne Wadsworth said that

the motive was to obtain the t r u s t money oft tha David Newton Wheeler
t

trust

money was the only

motive that e x i s t e d
•

Mark

Whoolor.

Q.

*f

i trial.

{

for art^iwi

tho following

Do yotr>6call jkf

5norlo; )

I1 shoot

•

took

placa.(Trial

oiCfor-bolng aado

prior to tho trial In tho tru*t cat* Mm ftottlo thtft cast by
4

t

corporate - trust** or a bank as a

trustoo If Mr. M N t l t r mould' aoroo to nowor attempt to
broak tho trust and portonally cat a hold of tho aonoy?
A. fMiipunii IWliiiiiiiiTiH ii j not.
• - f* 7"-

asktiat. f%f^.

:

«
TrW
t h a t of f o r had boon aado,

b*o% a«co#to# i*M* t h a t .
Ti -

qualification

toXlaony^ MM

oa»httlc

11 mould hauo

torn** Hgtl Liaals and attarnay Hayna Wadsworth *r« both
mambars

tha Sial* tar.

lath wara awarn to taatlfy to tha truth.
la*

On* testimony has to be

-36-

1, ,h*ga always found
Pa it] I :l a p i s t ::: • lb • • i • honest and ethical

i ag* ry datai 1.

iNiiiii I (ii (ill (in i tgidanca that Wayna Wads worth hat littl i
no regard for 'acts or truth, in "! i 111 transcript Pag* T 7

• p o s i t i o n which h%vt#ott
Th*

testimon

:l s

patantly

un«s

fait' i

iii ( i ci

lie ii owi it

il „ na

lin*s -20

in California.

Ilia il

ii ^ a

tadsworth t*stifi*d that h# had i

deposition taken of him. fll*flt

*

Hadswor^

t

M i d * a n * ttmtmmmn

Ilia f

ii i

th*

states

'ill

t r d*p*sitio<

^ nt o r n i a

a n d stat<

( i c a i all

inquired 1 nto at this Mini ""

i n * * 5 thru Ill

> Il

Il I Jil

Wayna

il th*

" that h* Wayna

Wayna Wads worth.
of t h a t aboue rmf*rr*4

i i , Ill ,

^ Il > ' (

Il il t III :
Pag* 57
(Ik: f il il i

Ill * g i t i « a t * l y

i1.**. was s aid as a statemant of fact
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m•

.„-.;&,£&;

Paga

166. Uayna Wads worth sa

Detective Thompson told him the Los Angelas Detectives left him so
requests

fpft

to

follow

through

*r
on.

On Page 379, - lines 10 thru 25 and Pa§a 380 - lines 1 thru \

Wayne Wadsworth testified Chief Deputy Sheehard already knew Stanlc
C. Mann's

num^/from

tha Los

Angeles detectives.
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Testimony
occasions

given

by

is contradictory

Wayne

Wadsworth

He has committed

on

various

separate

perjury in his own

.monies.

JANUARY

Mr.

11,

Wadsworth

stated

alleged

facts

personal knowledge
Page

.ines 6-17.
MR. WADSWORTH:
"Well, I'm sure that he honmWly believes
that may be the case.
But he doesn't Irnnway** background
of the situation like s o w of the re«t~of~ujBo7 ;r
"And the reason I know something mK*»"» J ^ r * i because Mr.
Wheeler is married to iv wife's. yo"u"noj^rslstsr. and I've
been acgualnted. of course, with tjimmTevor since their
marriage.
"And I can assure the Court I h s t ^ B ^ f V * way I . not only
w i l l there be no f i n d i n g t h a t T h a j W T s an unf\fr homo, there
m i l l be a f i n d i n g t h a t i t i s irvdJE** »«o p e r c e n t i l e of one
or two percent of the h d m e s j ^ u S n i c h a c h i l d could be
Placed."

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING I N .
JANUARY 12, 1979.

Mr. Wads worth.

it BRYANT CROFT'S COURT ROOM
ited alleged) f a c t s from his

personal knowledge.
Page 4ii

Lines 22 t h r u 34

41 - tines 1 thru 13

MR. WADSWOtTW^-t-fJKow a l o t of references have been made to
what c o u n s e l ^ H e a n ' t know about whore the c h i l d i s going
and a l l o f ^ K t t .
1 know where ho i s ooina Your Honor.
]
to
1Attl
l ' M l llMmmPP" I I nrr±md
** ***•'*
« sister.
I
h a o ^ s M P I I B h o i r h o m o mane times.
I know the kind of
I ' s u p I > - # > • ! I>i
Wo have a l r e a d y , as I s a i d ; contacted
t h % r » J K n i * | r 4 » ^ and he t e l l s us the c h i l d , being no older
thaftmmfxr i * » i t w i l l remember.
He says he doesn't know
t a > | T j h i c h i l d has had w i t h the mother.
I can
tsJJP"' W9us#."-t1m the
evidence i s
produced, she
visited
' t u a l l y every time Mr. wheeler v i s i t e d w i t h the c h i l d . "
he was t h e r e .
She bought him clothes.
He has got toys
r
a t her home t h a t are s t i l l t h e r e .
She bathed him, put him
down f o r a nap, took care of him during the time—"

19

Page 16 - Lines 20 thru 25
Q.

Page 17 - Lines^T thru 16

Would i t be f a i r to say that the ciyJT tort cases you

nav€Ti*Jor1red om^and* «auenf€ gone to trffcl would number in
excess of 1,000?
A.
Q.

I guess it would.
When

did you first

becojfT inuolved,

even

if not

employed, but contacted, invoked in something that led to
representation of either **rKor
A.

Sylul Wheeler?

Wall, the fir*tr ti»JJ*I was contacted was early one

morning — - I think \Jjfm%

probably the day following the

day on which the alJpXane crash In which Jaaafwas killed
occurred.
Q.

Mho taada tha^Rjfhtact?

A.

Mark.

Q.

I t was a ^fephone contact?

A.

Yes.

Q.

" H TfljfflTH* «*«* ***** ** *"•* **— *

A.

Yes. iTha* — a h f once or twice bafore that.

Q.~ a»a»T*MMfrth* clrcu—tancaa of naur arlor —otlnqs with
***

*v

ana t l — I auess I r e — b a r the beet wav mv
rtfo^r «Tda a* th» f W l » all ha* Chritfa* Eve dinner
and that tort of thlna at our elaee one wear.' and I
think, it I reaaetber right

Mark and Svlui mere <Hifw

^3ZT3P?X3E*^^-m
-40-

u-wm'-ur

DEPOSITION TAKEN OF WAYNE WADSWORTH

UNDER OATH BY

UAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL AND MCCARTHY ON FEBRUARY 23, 1982
Page 294 - Lines 4 thru 25.
Q.

You told me that the Wheelers had been in your^HDme on
a couple of occasions before they ever retaijpc you in
Haue you %^9r personally beeJSftn the

this matter.

Wheelers' home?A.

Yes.
Before the shooting?

A,

Yes, I'm sure.
Just briefly, hom many occasij
home, total of what period
of

you

in their

[me and ouer uihat period

%%*•**

I think there haue been^JUfr- I mas there once before
They had

once sh^gBV after they purchased their

property in Northrjjpf and before the yard uias finithed
and that sort of^fclnk. before they had a pool there or
anything,

I rt

er being there once.

It mould be on

my wife and I mould be in the L. A. area,

occasions

to Disneyland or something, uie mould

takina

span* J^0[ay with than or something lika that.

Then

another tlwe that Itotasthare aftar tha pool
>leted.

And I mas there at the time of the

Fsltions that mere taken in the custody case. Then I
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TESTIMONY GIUEN

BY WAYNE WADSWORTtt ttNOtir^OATfr IN JUDGE

PHILIP

FISHLER'S COURT ROOM JULY 26, 1984.
Pages 368, 369 & 370 (Lines 1 thru 12)
Q.

Prior to the hearing on the 11th of January, houi many
times had you been in the Wheeler's home?

A.

Prior to the llth of January?

Q.

1979?

A.

I don:t think I had been in their home prior to Januan
llth.

Q.

of 1979?

A.

January of 1979.

Q.

How about January 12th? .Did you go there bajluoen the
llth and the 12th?

A.

No. sure didn't.

Q.

Sir: on January 12th..'^m*. Ill frant of Judge Croft, yc
made the following statement, didn't vou?

"I know wher

he^s going. Your Honor, because this man is married to
my wife's little sister.
many times.

I have been in their homa

I know the kind of people they are."

You

mad* that statement, didn't you?
A.

Yes, I was referring to Sylul Wheeler's home because, a
I expressed earlier, she is the one that would be reall
taking care of Dawid on a day-to-day basis, so I was
referring to them.
many, many times.

I'd been in her home she grew up i
I knew what kind of a person she was

I knew what kind of a family she came from and I had
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every confidonco that Dauid would be well taken care of
in her home.
That isn't what it says, though, is it?
I think that's what it says.

I just talked about Sylvi

Wheeler and 1 said I'd been in their home.

She had

just very recently married Mark Wheeler.
"I know where he's going. Your Honor, because this man
is married to my wife's little sister.
their homo many times.
are.'1

I have been in

I know what kind of people they

Those are the words you said, are they not?

Well, those are tho words I said and that's
On tho 11th sir
Mr. Christenson:
The Court:

Lot him finish his answer.

Wore you finished, Mr. Madsworth?

The Witness:

I think so. Your Honors

On tho llth you made tho following statement to the
court, did you not:? "And tho reason I know something
about it It because Mr. Wheeler is married to my wife's
younger sister and I've boon acquainted, of course, with
thorn

O I M ^ ^ K O

their marriage, and I can assure you

that that's why I know - I know you will not bo hearing
this, but not only will there be no finding that it's an
unfit homo, thoro will bo a finding that it's in the top
percentile of one or two percent of tho homos which the
child can be placed.N

Those are tho words you spoke,

are they not, sir?
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A.

They are: and that's what I belleued.

I'd be happy to

have a child in Silvi Wheeler's home.
Q.

And vou had newer been in Svlvi and Mark Wheeler's horn
Isn't that true?

A.

I think that it is true that I haue not been in their
home after they had gotten married.

Q.

And it's also true that your client, the petitioner,
the person you mere trying to get custody for, was not
Sylui Wheeler;

it was Mark Wheeler.

Isn't that also

true?
A.

That is true; and, as I told you, it was going to be
Sylui that has to take care of him on a d«y-=4To-day
basis.

Wayne

Wadsuiorth

has

committed

perjury

on

a

number

o

occasions for the purpose of implicating Louis* S. Mann and Stanle
C. Mann in a vicious crime for which they were totally innocent an
continue to commit perjury in order to cover up the vile acts he ha
perpetrated.
CONCLUSION
I

s t a r t ^ to write the

book OWE AGAINST THE STORM

as

personal tribute to my niece, Joan Newton Wheeler, so her son Davie
would know of his mother's love and sacrifices for him and for other
single parents and their children in similar circumstances.
believed it would turn out as it did.
Wadsworth

I never

I had no way of knowing Wayne

and his FAMILY CLIENTS would perpetrate such vile acts to

destroy both my wife and myself with such lies and accusations.
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A lia doas not caasa to ba a lia lust because it Is said
uihila in tha procass of advocacy.
claim immunity
advocacy

doas,

from suit,
not

taka

Evan though an attornay

might

bacauss it was said In tha procass of
away

another's

right

others, who hava raad that falsa statamant

to

communicata

to

in tha papar or in a

legal document, that: ifc**s falsa.
Wayne Wadsworth's

accusations

Stanley c. Mann, in representing
referred

to

in

tha

book

against

Louisa S. Mann, and

his Family Clients

"QUE AGAINST

THE

in tha cases

STORtt" are

falsa,

I

believe the constitutional right to so state they were falsa balongs
to any

citizen.

By

common

used

definitions,

those

accusations

amount to lyirfg and perjury on the part of Wayne Wadsworth, whether
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done in the process of advocacy or otherwise.

Respectfully submitted.

Stanley^C. Mann, pro se..

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This

is

to certify

that I delivered

foregoing BRIEF OF THE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT to:
Ray Christensen. Esq.
Christensen, Jensen and Powell
900 Kearns Building
Salt D k e City. Utah Btioi
Lorin N. Pace, Esq.
Pace, Klint. Wunderli 4 Parsons
1200 University Club Building
136 East juth TeAple
Salt Lak- City. Utah §4111
DATED this //

day of ilJ»/S*y*

. !»•«
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two copies of thi

